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HOW THE RISE OF BIG DATA AND PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS ARE
CHANGING THE ATTORNEY’S DUTY OF COMPETENCE
Peter Segrist*
If the legal profession had been able to foresee in the late
1990s and early 2000s, prior to the meteoric rise and ensuing
cultural ubiquity of social media, that every tagged spring break
photo, 2:00 a.m. status update, and furious wall post would one
day be vulnerable to potential exposure in the cold, unforgiving
light of civil and criminal litigation, attorneys would have been
well-advised to discuss the ramifications of such actions,
statements, and disclosures with their clients. Today, a similar
phenomenon is looming in the form of the collection, aggregation,
analysis and sale of personal data, and it will be the prudent
attorney who competently advises his clients to stay ahead of the
curve.
From the standpoint of attorney competency, the emergence of
the Internet has forced attorneys to confront unique and complex
ethical problems in terms of advising clients as to which types of
Internet activity may be off limits or ill-advised. The recent ethics
opinions of several bar associations demonstrate how
technological advances are effectively shaping the duty of
competence, concluding that an attorney’s duty of competence may
include an obligation to advise clients regarding their posts to
social media. Contemporaneously, the data broker industry has
rapidly expanded into the digital sphere, daily collecting huge
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swaths of consumers’ personal information. That information is
now legally exchanged between entities for value, and
sophisticated analytical tools have been developed that permit data
holders to make meaningful, highly accurate and highly personal
deductions and predictions from high volume, seemingly chaotic,
datasets. This Article argues that the same rationale that supports
the notion that attorneys should advise clients against
irresponsible social media usage also supports the finding that,
given the current lack of regulation on the collection,
commoditization, aggregation and analysis of consumer data,
there is an emerging ethical obligation to advise clients regarding
the responsible, and, ideally, anonymous, use of the Internet.
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I. INTRODUCTION
[T]he intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and
man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive
to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to
the individual; but modern enterprise and invention have, through
invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress,
far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.1

The creation of the Internet has forced attorneys to confront
complex ethical problems when advising clients on appropriate
Internet activity. Recent ethics opinions from several bar
associations have concluded that an attorney’s duty of competency
extends to advising clients regarding their posts to social media,
subject to substantive rules regarding spoliation, due to the huge
potential impact that such postings can have on a client’s position
in both potential and ongoing litigation.2 Activities on social media,
general Internet browsing, and myriad other everyday activities
now generate tremendous amounts of seemingly innocuous personal
data. 3 Contemporaneously, the data broker industry, which has
essentially commoditized information associated with the
1

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 196 (1890).
2
See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Social Media Ethics Guidelines (2014),
https://www.nysba.org/Sections/Commercial_Federal_Litigation/Com_Fed_PDFs/
Social_Media_Ethics_Guidelines.html [hereinafter NYSBA Opinion]; Phila. Bar
Ass’n, Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 2014-5, at 4–5 (2014), available at
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/Opinions2010Present?appNum=4 [hereinafter
PBA Opinion] (discussing discovery concerns related to social media); N.Y.
Cnty. Lawyers Ass’n, Op. 745 (2013), available at http://www.nycla.org/
siteFiles/Publications/Publications1630_0.pdf [hereinafter NYCLA Opinion]
(discussing advising a client regarding posts on social media sites); Pa. Bar
Ass’n, Formal Opinion 2014-300, available at https://www.pabar.org/members/
catalogs/Ethics%20Opinions/formal/F2014-300.pdf#search=%222014-300%22
[hereinafter Penn. Opinion] (discussing ethical obligations for attorney using
social media); N.C. State Bar Ass’n, Formal Ethics Op. 5 (2014) [hereinafter
NCB Opinion], http://www.ncbar.com/ethics/ethics.asp?page= 5&from=7/2014;
ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, cmt. 8 (placing an affirmative
duty upon attorneys to stay abreast of technological developments relevant to
the practice of law as part of their competency obligation).
3
See generally infra Part II (discussing private sector data collection practices).
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individual, has rapidly expanded into the digital sphere, collecting
huge swaths of consumers’ personal information daily. This
information is now legally exchanged between entities for value,
and sophisticated analytical tools have been developed that permit
data holders to make meaningful, highly accurate, and highly
personal deductions and predictions from high volume, seemingly
chaotic, datasets. Given the current lack of regulation on the
collection, commoditization, aggregation, and analysis of
consumer data, this Article argues that the same rationale that
supports the notion that attorneys should advise clients against
irresponsible social media usage also supports the finding that
there is an emerging ethical obligation to advise clients regarding
the responsible and, ideally, anonymous Internet use.
Since the first censuses were conducted and crop yields
recorded in the ancient world, data collection and analysis have
been crucial components of a wide array of societal and
technological improvements.4 Today, data storage and processing
costs are plummeting, while data collection methods are increasing.
Simultaneously, increases in the number and variety of
data-producing devices—sensor technologies, GPS trackers, and
the so-called “Internet of things,”5 —as well as the number of
individuals connected to the Internet, have given rise to a situation
wherein the amount of data presently available to both
governments and private industries to feed the machinery of
information processing analysis, with regards to either an entire
population, or a single individual, has become unimaginably huge.6
4

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES,
PRESERVING VALUES 1 (2014), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf [hereinafter WHITE
HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT]; see also VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER &
KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA 21 (2014) [hereinafter CUKIER BIG DATA]
(discussing early censuses and associated problems).
5
See infra notes 61–69, and accompanying text, describing the Internet of
things as the sum of all devices connected to the Internet, such as thermostats,
heart monitors, car insurance company driving monitors, and the like.
6
See WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 1 (“The collection,
storage, and analysis of data is on an upward and seemingly unbounded
trajectory, fueled by increases in processing power, the cratering costs of
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In the wake of these advancements, a relatively new industry
has developed. In its recent report on Big Data, the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) defined data brokers as “companies that
collect consumers’ personal information and resell or share that
information with others.”7 Personal data has been commoditized,
and is now sold and exchanged like any other good by these data
brokers. As the practice of wide scale data collection grows, both
private industry and governmental bodies and agencies are rapidly
discovering that algorithmic8 analyses of vast troves of information
empower the data holders to make staggering deductions about
anything from where the next flu epidemic is likely to strike in the
United States, to whether a woman is pregnant and the date of
conception, to a person’s likelihood of committing a criminal act,
and much more.9 This is the essence of the emerging field of
predictive analytics wherein technological advances have created

computation and storage, and the growing number of sensor technologies
embedded in devices of all kinds.”); Yafit Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and
Public Choice: From Legislative Battles to Private Ordering, 27 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 203, 253 (2013) (describing user activity in the billions at sites such as
Google and YouTube); Amit Chowdry, Samsung, Intel and Dell Launch
“Internet of Things” Consortium, FORBES (July 9, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/amitchowdhry/2014/07/09/samsung-intel-and-dell-launch-internet-of-thingsconsortium/; CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 9 (“The amount of stored
information grows four times faster than the world economy, while the
processing power of computers grows nine times faster.”).
7
FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY
AND ACCOUNTABILITY at i (2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federaltrade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
8
See Algorithm, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “algorithm”
as “[a] mathematical or logical process consisting of a series of steps, designed
to solve a specific type of problem”).
9
See generally infra Part III (discussing big data and predictive analytics); see
also WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at pmbl. (“A significant
finding of this report is that big data analytics have the potential to eclipse
longstanding civil rights protections in how personal information is used in
housing, credit, employment, health, education, and the marketplace.”).
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the ability to make detailed predictions and deductions from
gigantic, and seemingly chaotic, datasets.10
No single technological advancement since the invention of the
printing press has so dramatically affected nearly every aspect of
human society as has the Internet. Its birth and development have
resulted in dramatic and global shifts in countless professions, and
the legal profession has not been immune to this transformation.11
For instance, attorneys arguably have an ethical obligation to be
able to competently navigate the Internet as part of their basic
researching skills.12 The American Bar Association (“ABA”) now

10

See generally infra Part III.C (discussing predictions and deductions that
are capable of being made from large datasets).
11
David Hricik, Lawyers Worry Too Much about Transmitting Client Confidences
by Internet E-mail, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 459 (1998) (“The Internet has
changed American business, including the legal profession.”); James Podgers,
Lawyers Struggle to Reconcile New Technology with Traditional Ethics Rules,
ABA J. (Nov. 1, 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_
fundamentals_lawyers_struggle_to_reconcile_new_technology_with_traditio/;
ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics 20/20, Introduction and Overview (2012),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/
20120508_ethics_20_20_final_hod_introdution_and_overview_report.authchec
kdam.pdf (“[T]echnology has irrevocably changed and continues to alter the
practice of law in fundamental ways.”); Andrew Perlman, The Twenty-First
Century Lawyer’s Evolving Ethical Duty of Competence, 22 N O. 4 T HE
PROF. LAW. 1 (2014), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/
professional_lawyer/2014/volume-22-number-4/the_twentyfirst_century_lawyers_
evolving_ethical_duty_competence.html (identifying electronic discovery and
cloud-based services as some of evolving facets of a lawyer’s duty of
competence).
12
See generally Lawrence D. MacLachlan, Gandy Dancers on the Web: How
the Internet Has Raised the Bar on Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility to
Research and Know the Law, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 607 (2000); see also
Perlman, supra note 11, at 4 (discussing Iowa Supreme Court Att’y Disciplinary
Bd. v. Wright, 840 N.W.2d 295, 301–04 (Iowa 2013), where a lawyer was
disciplined for permitting his clients to fall for a well-known internet scam
involving an inheritance from a distant Nigerian relative, because the lawyer
failed to conduct a “‘cursory internet search’ that would have uncovered the
truth,” and Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 558–59 (Mo. 2010),
wherein the “Missouri Supreme Court recently held that lawyers should use
‘reasonable efforts,’ including Internet-based tools, to uncover the litigation
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routinely releases ethics opinions addressing issues such as a
lawyer’s ability to review and research a juror’s Internet presence13
or what is required to protect confidentiality when sending an
unencrypted email to a client.14
Squarely addressing such developments, the ABA recently
added a comment to Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct modifying an attorney’s competency obligations to
include an affirmative duty to educate him or herself as to
technologies relevant to the practice of law.15 Addressing clients’
social media postings, several bar associations’ recent ethics
opinions have noted that an attorney’s competency obligations
under Rule 1.1 could “give rise to an obligation to advise clients,
within legal and ethical requirements, concerning what steps to
take to mitigate any adverse effects on the clients’ position
emanating from the clients’ use of social media.”16 This stems from
the simple and obvious proposition that an individual should be
careful in allowing personal information about one’s self to be
disseminated into the world, as that information may ultimately be
used against its owner.
Applying the foregoing concept to big data collection and an
attorney’s duty to advise clients, consider the following: big data
analytics are now capable of making increasingly personal
deductions about individuals from large, seemingly random
datasets and a largely unregulated for-profit industry has emerged
for the purpose of personal data collection, commodification,
history of jurors prior to trial in order to preserve possible objections to the
empanelment of those jurors”).
13
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 466 (2014)
(discussing an attorney’s ability to review a juror’s Internet “presence”).
14
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 413 (1999); see
generally Peter Geraghty, Cybersecurity and the Use of Emerging Technologies,
Part 1, YOUR ABA (Dec. 2014), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
publications/youraba/2014/december-2014/cybersecurity-and-the-use-of-emergingtechnologies--part-1.html.
15
MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, cmt. 8.
16
NYCLA Opinion, supra note 2; see also NYSBA Opinion, supra note 2;
PBA Opinion, supra note 2; Penn. Opinion, supra note 2; NCB Opinion, supra
note 2.
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aggregation, analysis and sale.17 Moreover, anonymization of this
data is not feasible as a long-term solution to privacy concerns.18
Further, the technology exists today that would allow a data broker
to use already legally-collected information pertaining to a given
individual to make highly accurate deductions and predictions
about that individual. Consider also the steadily increasing utility
and ubiquity of informal discovery and online research in
litigation—including the employment of data brokers by
attorneys.19
The practical applications and advantages of having access to
such information on one’s adversaries for parties engaged in
litigation, or potential litigation, are readily apparent, both in terms
of leading to discoverable evidence to be used at trial as well as in
discovering inadmissible information that is nevertheless
advantageous to creative litigants engaged in contentious civil or
criminal litigation. For instance, imagine the value to a corporate
defendant engaged in settlement negotiations with an injured
plaintiff-employee to know that that injured worker is facing
severe financial constraints. Consider the degree to which that
same defendant’s negotiating position would be strengthened if it
possessed information that the same plaintiff had a child at home
with an expensive-to-treat chronic illness—how much more
financially desperate and, thus, eager to settle, would such a
plaintiff be? Consider further how advantageous it would be for a
family law attorney to be able to employ data experts to determine
the likelihood of a party’s infidelity or the likelihood of a spouse’s
continued substance abuse in child custody proceedings. How
might such information inform settlement negotiations,
investigatory tactics, or trial strategy?
17

See, e.g., CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 156 (“[F]irms of all stripes
amass mountains of personal information concerning all aspects of our lives,
share it with others without our knowledge, and use it in ways we could hardly
imagine.”).
18
See infra Part III.D (discussing the shortcomings of anonymization
strategies).
19
See, e.g., infra notes 111–13 and accompanying text (discussing attorneys’
use of data brokers).
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The field of predictive analytics,20 described below, is becoming
more sophisticated, and is capable of making increasingly accurate
deductions from the personal data already available to data
brokers. Data brokers already create profiles and dossiers of
individuals for sale.21 The primary constraints on the industry are
self-regulatory in nature, enforced only by the public’s capacity for
outrage at private sector data collection and privacy intrusions.22
Had legal practitioners been able to foresee twenty years ago the
impact that public online postings and social media would have on
future litigation, attorneys may have prevented their clients from
voluntarily distributing highly personal, potentially damaging
information out into the world. Since personal information, once
gleaned—from browsing habits, online purchases, customer
loyalty and reward cards, the use of the various devices that
comprise the Internet of things, online surveys, GPS tracking
20

See infra Part III.A (describing the field of predictive analytics).
See infra notes 107–10 and accompanying text (describing “people search”
and related products).
22
See PEW RES. CTR., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN
THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA 3 (Nov. 12, 2014), available at http://www.
pewinternet.org/files/2014/11/PI_PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy_111214.pdf (noting
that, even though a majority of Americans would like to see the government do
more to regulate private sector data collection, fifty-five percent of respondents
“‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ with the statement: ‘I am willing to share some
information about myself with companies in order to use online services for
free.’”); see also infra notes 270–71 and accompanying text; 60 Minutes: Data
Brokers (CBS television broadcast Aug. 24, 2014); Shannon Pettypiece & Jordan
Roberston, Did You Know You Know Had Diabetes? It’s All Over the Internet,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/news/201409-11/how-big-data-peers-inside-your-medicine-chest. But see PEW RES. CTR.,
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA
28 (Nov. 12, 2014), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/11/PI_
PublicPerceptionsofPrivacy_111214.pdf (“[P]ublic concern over the amount of
personal information businesses are collecting has been growing.”). See
generally infra Part II.C. Given current research and trends, it would not be
unreasonable for one to conclude that, although public concern over private
sector data collection may be growing as Americans become more educated on
the subject, few will demand comprehensive change simply due to the
convenience offered by free online services. See infra note 270 and
accompanying text (discussing “privacy fatigue”).
21
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information reported by mobile devices, and on and on—is often
never truly deleted, this Article attempts to make the case that a
new ethical obligation is emerging which makes it incumbent upon
attorneys to advise their clients of what is necessary to prevent
their personal data from leaking out into the digital world today, so
that it might not be used against them tomorrow.
Part II describes some of the more common private sector data
collection practices. Part III introduces big data and predictive
analytics, and attempts to demonstrate how conclusions can be
drawn from vast amounts of seemingly innocuous data. Part IV
describes the current legal climate in which the industry operates.
Part V comments on the impact these developments are having on
the attorney’s duty of competence. Part VI then sets forth some of
the more basic suggested techniques of stopping or, at least,
slowing and diluting the flow of one’s personal data out into the
digital realm.
II. THE HARVEST—HOW INFORMATION IS COLLECTED,
AGGREGATED, AND PROCESSED
“Our digital reach will soon approach nearly every Internet user
in the U.S.”23
Begin with this basic premise: deductions can be made from
information. The more information one has, the more one can
deduce. Additionally, when one has historical data for comparison,
one can more accurately make predictions. The following section
discusses some of the more common ways that private companies
23

Judith Aquino, Acxiom Prepares New ‘Audience Operating System’ Amid
Wobbly Earnings, AD EXCHANGER (Aug. 1, 2013 2:48 PM), http://www.
adexchanger.com/analytics/acxiom-prepares-new-audience-operating-system-amidwobbly-earnings/ (quoting Scott Howe, CEO of Acxiom); see also Richard
Behar, Never Heard of Acxiom? Chances Are It’s Heard of You, FORTUNE (Feb.
23, 2004), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2004/
02/23/362182/index.htm; ACXIOM CORP., ANNUAL REPORT (2013), available at
d3u9yejw7h244g.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/2013-Annual-Report.pdf
(“[O]ur capabilities include . . . multi-sourced insight into approximately 700
million consumers worldwide [with] [o]ver 3,000 propensities for nearly every
U.S. consumer.”).
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are amassing information about virtually every person on earth—
one click, purchase, or digital transaction at a time—in order to
make those deductions and sell the results.
A. Tracking Methodology
The diversity of methods by which information is collected in
today’s increasingly digitized environment is difficult to overstate.
Take Internet browsing: the typical person’s daily Internet activity
is collected, traced, logged, and analyzed by a dizzying number of
entities in a variety of ways. The data-collecting entities
themselves are often divided into two groups: so-called “first
parties”—social media, news websites, online retailers, and other
consumer websites—who collect information directly from users,
often unbeknownst to the users themselves, and “third parties”—
those to whom information is either passed by first parties or who
conduct their own monitoring and tracking of one’s browsing
habits surreptitiously.24
Every individual computer, smartphone, and tablet currently
connected to the Internet has a unique Internet Protocol (“IP”)
address, like a digital fingerprint.25 While websites need a user’s IP

24

WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 41; see also Daniel J.
Solove, Privacy & Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1411 (2001) (“Currently, there are two basic
ways personal information is collected in cyberspace: (1) by directly collecting
information from users (registration and transactional data); and (2) by
surreptitiously tracking the way people navigate through the Internet
(clickstream data).”); see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle, et al., Symposium: Privacy
and Accountability in the 21st Century: Behavioral Advertising: The Offer You
Cannot Refuse, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 276 (2012).
25
See Anne Klinefelter, When to Research is to Reveal: The Growing Threat
to Attorney and Client Confidentiality from Online Tracking, 16 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 6 (2011); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem:
Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1814, 1837 (2011) (describing the IP address as “a unique identifier that
is assigned to every computer connected to the internet”); see also Joshua J.
McIntyre, Symposium: Trial 2010: A Look Inside Our Nation’s Courtrooms:
Twentieth Annual DePaul Law Review Symposium: Comment: Balancing
Expectations of Online Privacy: Why Internet Protocol (IP) Addresses Should
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address to deliver content, some websites also use these unique
addresses to track Internet users for purposes such as billing,
customer service, tracking user preferences, and targeted
marketing, among others.26 It is also standard practice for websites
to collect the web address or universal resource locator (“URL”) of
the page that linked to them (i.e. the referring URL) which itself
can reveal the user’s immediately prior-used search terms and
websites visited, while also collecting the date and time that
someone from a particular IP address visited their website.27
While IP addresses, being generally fixed, are typically
associated with either a unique home or office Internet connection,
and thus easily associated with a specific individual through their
Internet Service Provider (“ISP”), they can also easily become
associated with a specific individual through a rather simple
analysis of a user’s web traffic.28 First-party websites also acquire
personal information whenever a user willingly volunteers it, for
instance, by opening an account and giving a full name, home
address, email address, or taking an online quiz entitled “Are You
Good in Bed?”.29 A recent article in the Washington Post reported
that the analytics code used by BuzzFeed, a self-described “social
Be Protected as Personally Identifiable Information, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 895,
895–96 (2011).
26
Klinefelter, supra note 25, at 6; see also Eloise Gratton, If Personal
Information Is Privacy’s Gatekeeper, then Risk of Harm is the Key: A Proposed
Method for Determining What Counts as Personal Information, 24 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 105, 122 (2014) (citing Lisa J. Sotto & Melinda L. McLellan,
Online Behavioral Advertising: A User’s Guide, IP LITIG., Nov.–Dec. 2012, at
1–2) (“[B]ehavioral advertising may often involve the collection of IP addresses
and the processing of unique identifiers (through the use of cookies).”).
27
Klinefelter, supra note 25, at 8.
28
See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 25, at 1837–40 (discussing various
techniques that enable the linking of IP addresses to specific individuals and
providing several examples). See, e.g., infra notes 170–77. See also Elbert Lin,
Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1085, 1104 n.101 (2002) (discussing static versus dynamic IP addresses).
29
See Steven C. Bennett, Regulating Online Behavioral Advertising, 44 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 899, 901 (2011); Alyssa Bailey, Quiz: Are You Good in
Bed?, COSMOPOLITAN (July 2, 2014), http://www.cosmopolitan.com/sex-love/
a26964/cosmo-quiz-are-you-good-in-bed/.
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news and entertainment company[,]” indicated that “the site has
tools in place to build individualized data profiles based on users’
quiz responses—which sometimes include deeply personal
information, like whether you[ have] had an eating disorder or
taken meds for a mental illness.”30
Independent of IP address tracking, one of the most common
ways that both first- and, particularly, third-party tracking occurs is
with “cookies.” 31 Cookies are small bits of text that are
downloaded automatically from websites by a user’s browser as
one navigates the Internet.32 They essentially identify the computer
on which they are stored, carrying information about what a user
does online back to the website that attached the cookie to the
user’s computer in the first place.33 Websites use cookies for a
variety of purposes, such as remembering a user’s preferences on
that site or understanding how users are actually using a site in
order to improve site performance and security. 34 Cookies also
track browsing activity and collect information for advertisers and
data brokers. 35 Further, while cookies do not always contain
30

BUZZFEED, About, http://www.buzzfeed.com/about (last visited Dec. 28,
2014); Caitlin Dewey, The Scary, Eye-Opening Truth of Internet Tracking – on
Buzzfeed Quizzes, and Everywhere Else, WASH. POST (Jun. 26, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2014/06/26/the-scary-eyeopening-truth-of-internet-tracking-on-buzzfeed-quizzes-and-everywhere-else/.
31
See Joanna Geary, Tracking the Trackers: What Are Cookies? An Introduction
to Web Tracking, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 2012, 12:08 PM), http://www.
theguardian.com/technology/2012/apr/23/cookies-and-web-tracking-intro. Jay P.
Kesan et al., Information Privacy and Data Control in Cloud Computing:
Consumers, Privacy Preferences, and Market Efficiency, 70 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 341, 437 (2013) (describing cookies).
32
See Kesan et al., supra note 31, at 437 (describing the distinction between
text cookies and flash cookies).
33
Geary, supra note 31; Kesan et al., supra note 31, at 437.
34
Geary, supra note 31; see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., Behavioral
Advertising: The Offer You Cannot Refuse, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 273, 276
(2012) (defining cookies as “small text files that typically contain a string of
numbers that can be used to identify a computer”).
35
See Adam Tanner, The Web Cookie Is Dying. Here’s the Creepier Technology
That Comes Next, FORBES (June 17, 2013, 12:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/adamtanner/2013/06/17/the-web-cookie-is-dying-heres-the-creepier-technologythat-comes-next/; see also FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at v (“Data brokers rely
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personally identifiable information, some companies specifically
provide the service of linking cookies to users’ personal
information.36
Many websites, however, are now employing alternatives to
cookies in order to track online behavior. This course change is in
part a response to the so-called “Do Not Track” (“DNT”)
initiative.37 In the Internet community’s attempt at a Do Not Call
list,38 the DNT concept was originally envisioned as a simple way
for consumers to control and limit the extent to which their online
activity is tracked.39 DNT features are often available as a setting
on an individual’s web browser that tells the browser to
communicate to websites that the user wishes not to have his or her
online activity tracked.40 Some browsers provide a similar feature
on websites with registration features and cookies to find consumers online and
target Internet advertisements to them based on their offline activities.”).
36
Kesan et al., supra note 31, at 437 (citing Daniel J. Solove, THE DIGITAL
PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 24–25 (2006))
(“[A] company called DoubleClick provides a service to websites, connecting
cookies to personal information to enable more targeted advertising.”); see also
Dillon Reisman et al., Cookies That Give You Away: Evaluating the
Surveillance Implications of Web Tracking 1–2 (Working Draft, Apr. 2, 2014),
available at http://randomwalker.info/publications/cookie-surveillance.pdf
(describing technical methods for identifying individuals through cookie
tracking even in the absence of knowing a target’s IP address); see also Adi
Kamdar et al., NSA Turns Cookies (And More) Into Surveillance Beacons, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 11, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/12/nsaturns-cookies-and-more-surveillance-beacons (describing the use of PREF
cookies to uniquely identify individuals).
37
WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 42–43.
38
Zach Miners, How Bickering and Greed Neutered the “Do Not Track”
Privacy Initiative, PC WORLD (May 22, 2014, 6:22 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/
article/2158220/do-not-track-oh-what-the-heck-go-ahead.html.
39
WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4 at 42–43. FEDERAL TRADE
COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS at vi–vii (2010),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federaltrade-commission-bureau-consumer-protection-preliminary-ftc-staff-report-protectingconsumer/101201privacyreport.pdf [hereinafter 2010 FTC Report].
40
WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 42–43; see also Do Not
Track Test Page, MICROSOFT, ie.microsoft.com/TEStdrive/Browser/DoNotTrack/
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by offering privacy settings that allow the wholesale blocking of
third-party cookies.41 However, currently, many sites do not honor
DNT requests. Even sites that do respond to DNT requests often
interpret such requests in different ways due to a lack of consensus
among Internet companies and service providers. Other sites
simply show unwillingness on their part to acquiesce to the intent
of DNT.42 As a result, while utilizing a DNT feature on one’s
browser will indeed send a signal to a host website that the user
wishes not to be tracked, that request will likely be ignored.43 In
what is generally a “self-regulating” industry, this phenomenon is
not encouraging.44
This has given rise to so-called “web beacons,” also known as
“pixel” tracking.45 These small bits of code embedded into a web
page that are invisible to the user and track that user’s activity
wherever they go online, sending signals regarding his or her
activity back to the beacons’ hosts.46 This is particularly relevant in
Default.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2014) (“This page detects whether or not
your browser has a Do Not Track preference set.”).
41
WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 42–43.
42
See Elizabeth Dwoskin, Yahoo Won’t Honor ‘Do Not Track’ Requests from
Users, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2014, 8:22 PM), blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/05/02/
yahoo-wont-honor-do-not-track-requests-from-users.
43
Miners, supra note 38; see also Dwoskin, supra note 42; Fred B. Campbell,
Jr., The Slow Death of “Do Not Track,” N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 26, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/12/27/opinion/the-slow-death-of-do-not-track.html?_r=0.
44
See infra notes 268–69 and accompanying text.
45
Geary, supra note 31; Violet Blue, Facebook Turns User Tracking “Bug”
Into Data Mining “Feature” for Advertisers, ZD NET (June 17, 2014, 12:01
PM), http://www.zdnet.com/facebook-turns-user-tracking-bug-into-data-miningfeature-for-advertisers-7000030603/; see also Matthew Sundquist, Online Privacy
Protection: Protecting Privacy, the Social Contract, and the Rule of Law in the
Virtual World, 25 REGENT U.L. REV. 153, 161–62 (2013) (“Lotame Solutions
uses web beacons that record what a person types on a website in order to create
a user profile, while Apple, Verizon, Target, and others compile information
from customers’ interactions with their products.”).
46
Geary, supra note 31; Blue, supra note 45; see also Pixel Tracking in
Third-Party and Custom Creatives, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/
dfp_premium/answer/1347585?hl=en (last visited Dec. 28, 2014) (“A tracking
pixel is simply code inserted into a custom or third-party creative that makes a
server call and returns a transparent 1x1 image (normally a GIF file).”); see also
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light of the changes to Facebook’s privacy policy that took place in
the summer of 2014. The new policy stated that Facebook would
begin collecting information about users from sites they visit, apps
they use, and their browsing histories, even when a user is not
logged into Facebook.47 The Facebook blog stated that, “[i]n short,
your browsing habits on any site or mobile app with a Facebook
like button (who doesn’t have that nowadays) can also be viewed
by Facebook and thus used for advertising data.”48
A relatively new technology known as “canvas fingerprinting”
is also growing in popularity as the tracking method du jour.49

Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Of Nodes and Power Laws: A Network Theory
Approach to Internet Jurisdiction Through Data Privacy, 98 NW. U.L. REV. 493,
496 n.17 (2004) (“A web bug, also known as a ‘pixel tag.’ ‘web beacon,’ or
‘clear GIF,’ is a lx1 pixel image embedded in html code. If a web bug is present,
instead of simply fetching an image, a server invokes a CGI program that logs
information about the user's actions.”).
47
See, e.g., Camila Domonoske, Facebook Ad Targeting Will Use Even More
of Your Data, NPR (June 12, 2014. 1:14 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/
alltechconsidered/2014/06/12/321325434/facebook-ad-targeting-will-use-evenmore-of-your-data. See also Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.
facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info (last visited Dec. 13, 2014) (discussing
“other information we receive about you”). It should be noted that the Facebook
privacy terms have since been further amended; however, as one technology
writer reported, quoting the Washington Post’s Switch blog, “Facebook rewrites
its privacy policy so that humans can understand it,” and also quoting Fortune’s
Tech blog as stating, “Facebook’s privacy policy is clearer, but no less
complicated.” Jennifer Abel, Facebook Rewrites and Sort-of Updates Its Privacy
Policies, Again, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.
consumeraffairs.com/news/
facebook-rewrites-and-sort-of-updates-its-privacy-policies-again-112414.html.
48
Shruti Dhapola, How Facebook’s New “Ad Preference” Policy is Threatening
Your Privacy, TECH2 (June 18, 2014, 9:52 AM), http://tech.firstpost.com/newsanalysis/how-facebooks-new-ad-preference-policy-is-threatening-your-privacy226028.html (quoting Facebook’s blog).
49
See Sneaky New Tactics May Be Tracking You Online, CBS NEWS (July 24,
2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/sneaky-new-tactics-may-betracking-you-online; see also Gunes Acar et al., The Web Never Forgets: Persistent
Tracking Mechanisms in the Wild (Aug. 10, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
available at https://securehomes.esat.kuleuven.be/~gacar/persistent/the_web_never_
forgets.pdf; Olga Kharif, The Cookies You Can’t Crumble, BUSINESSWEEK (Aug.
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Whereas traditional tracking methods involve the transfer of small
segments of code or files, such as cookies, thus enabling them to
be more easily identified by the user, canvas fingerprinting is
virtually undetectable to the average Internet user.50 This method is
predicated on the idea that no two computer systems are exactly
alike due to the extremely high number of possible combinations
of a multitude of variables from one device to another—in terms of
various operating systems, versions of those systems, browsers,
graphics settings, font settings, and the like—à la “fingerprinting.”51
Utilizing this phenomenon, websites send a request to a user’s
browser to draw a small text image, to which the browser
complies. Due to the differences in settings from one user’s
computer to another, this creates an identifiable “fingerprint,” in
that each computer and browser displays the text in a singular and
uniquely identifiable manner.52 Thus, when different websites use
the same tracking methodology, they can track a single user from
one site to another, generally unhindered by his or her use of antitracking tools or browser privacy settings.53
The use of these and similar technologies are commonly
employed to monitor the ongoing web activity of virtually all
Internet users on the planet. A 2010 Wall Street Journal
investigation found that the “nation’s 50 top websites on average
installed 64 pieces of tracking technology onto the computers of

21, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-08-21/facebook-googlego-beyond-cookies-to-reap-data-for-advertisers (discussing canvas fingerprinting).
50
See Joseph Steinberg, You Are Being Tracked Online By a Sneaky New
Technology—Here’s What You Need to Know, FORBES (July 23, 2014, 8:30
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/josephsteinberg/2014/07/23/you-are-beingtracked-online-by-a-sneaky-new-technology-heres-what-you-need-to-know/.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.; see also Chris Smith, The Creepiest Internet Tracking Tool Yet Is
“Virtually Impossible” to Block, BGR (July 22, 2014, 1:00 PM), bgr.com/2014/
07/22/canvas-fingerprinting-internet-tracking-tool/. But see Jeremy Kirk, ‘Canvas
Fingerprinting’ Online Tracking Is Sneaky but Easy to Halt, PC WORLD (July
25, 2014, 6:31 AM), www.pcworld.com/article/2458280/canvas-fingerprintingtracking-is-sneaky-but-easy-to-halt.html.
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visitors, usually with no warning.”54 Privacy issues quickly emerge
when third parties routinely track user activity en masse across
multiple websites, allowing trackers to “infer users’ interests,
perhaps sensitive ones, such as medical conditions, political
opinions, or even sexual fetishes.”55 Furthermore, promising efforts
are now underway to link consumers’ mobile devices to their home
computers—a difficulty that has stymied advertisers and data
brokers for some time—providing yet another source of personal
data to private sector trackers.56

54

See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 34, at 275 (quoting Julia Angwin, The
Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J. (July 30, 2010), available at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703940904575395073512989404).
55
Hoofnagle et al., supra note 34, at 276; see also WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA
REPORT, supra note 4, at 45 (“[Such precise profiling] represents a powerful
capacity on the part of the private sector to collect information and use that
information to algorithmically profile an individual . . . . This application of big
data technology, if used improperly, irresponsibly, or nefariously, could have
significant ramifications for targeted individuals.”).
56
See, e.g., DRAWBRIDGE, http://www.drawbrid.ge/technology (last visited
Aug. 21, 2014) (describing Drawbridge’s cross-linking of mobile devices to
computers); see also SILVERPUSH, http://www.silvrpush.com/ (last visited Aug.
21, 2014); Anthony Ha, SilverPush Says Its Using “Audio Beacons” for an
Unusual Approach to Cross-Device Ad Targeting, TECHCRUNCH (July 24,
2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/07/24/silverpush-audio-beacons/ (describing
“audio beacons”). Basically, the company says it uses “ultrasonic inaudible
sounds.” If you are browsing the web and encounter a SilverPush advertiser,
then at the same time that they are dropping a cookie on your computer, they
also play one of those sounds. You will not be able to hear it, but if you have
installed any app that uses the SilverPush software development kit, it will
actually be listening for that sound in the background, and when it detects an
“audio beacon,” it is able to identify that your desktop/laptop computer and your
phone/tablet belong to the same person. Id.; see also Kurt Wagner, Twitter to
Start Tracking Which Apps Its Users Have Downloaded, RE/CODE (Nov. 26,
2014, 9:45 AM), http://recode.net/2014/11/26/twitters-now-collecting-data-onwhich-apps-you-download/ (describing how both Apple’s iOS and Google’s
Android already allow third parties to “ping a user’s device at any time and
recall a list of apps that are currently running on their smartphone”); Robert
McMillan, Verizon & AT&T Are the Only Wireless Carriers Using ‘PermaCookies’, WIRED (Nov. 7, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/11/
permacookie-free/ (describing Verizon’s use of “perma-cookies”—small strings
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To illustrate the practice of online tracking, several companies
now offer products that allow Internet users to visualize online
tracking as it occurs. For instance, in late 2013, Mozilla released an
add-on57 called “Lightbeam” that was designed to demonstrate the
tracking phenomenon to a mainstream audience. 58 Funded by
grants from the Ford Foundation and the Natural Sciences and
Engineering Research Council, with assistance from students at the
Emily Carr University of Art and Design, the Lightbeam add-on
allows Firefox users to view a graphical representation of the
tracking of their Internet browsing in real time. The tool represents
the first-party sites that the user actually visits as circles and the
third-party sites that monitor a user’s activities as triangular icons
that revolve around their first party site counterpart.59 This allows
users to watch as, on average, approximately ten to thirty third
parties monitor their activities on the vast majority of first-party
sites.60
The Internet of things has further enhanced private companies’
ability to track consumers’ activities, and, thus, increased the
private sector’s capacity to gather detailed and personal
information on users. “Internet of things” is:
of data that come preinstalled on phones and are slipped into all users’ web
traffic for identification purposes).
57
See Add-on, TECHTERMS, http://www.techterms.com/definition/addon (last
visited Jul. 25, 2014) (defining “add-on” as “a software extension that adds extra
features to a program. It may extend certain functions within the program, add
new items to the program’s interface, or give the program additional
capabilities.”).
58
See Olivia Solon, Mozilla Releases Add-on that Reveals Online Data
Tracking, WIRED (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/201310/24/lightbeam; see also Samuel Gibbs, Mozilla’s Lightbeam Firefox Tool
Shows Who’s Tracking Your Online Movements, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 28,
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/oct/28/mozilla-lightbeamtracking-privacy-cookies.
59
See Add-ons for Firefox, MOZILLA, https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/
addon/lightbeam/ (last visited July 10, 2014).
60
These figures were generated from firsthand use of the Lightbeam add-on.
Notably, the Lightbeam privacy policy states “[b]y default, data collected by
Lightbeam remains in your browser and is not sent to us.” Add-ons for Firefox,
supra note 59.
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[A] term used to describe the ability of devices to communicate with
each other using embedded sensors that are linked through wired and
wireless networks. These devices could include your thermostat, your
car, or a pill you swallow so the doctor can monitor the health of your
digestive tract. These connected devices use the Internet to transmit,
compile, and analyze data.61

As GPS chips ping our mobile devices and offer us alternative
routes home to avoid traffic jams, and as we adjust our
thermostats, home security cameras, and other household devices
remotely, those devices produce data that is collected and available
for analysis, creating a massive new set of tools for data
production. 62 For instance, Nest, a recent $3.2 billion Google
acquisition, is a company that creates systems that allow users to
remotely control their thermostats.63 While one’s thermostat usage
may not appear particularly compromising on its own, it does
reveal highly particularized information about one’s living
patterns—when one rises in the morning, goes to work, comes
home in the evening, and goes to bed—which, when combined
61

WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 2; see also Rolfe
Winkler & Alistair Barr, Nest to Share User Information with Google for the
First Time, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2014, 12:16 AM), blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/
06/24/nest-to-share-user-information-with-google-for-first-time/.
62
See Chowdry, supra note 6; see also Bill Wasik, In the Programmable
World, All Our Objects Will Act as One, WIRED (May 14, 2013, 6:30 AM),
http://www.wired.com/2013/05/internet-of-things-2/ (“A decade after Wi-Fi put
all our computers on a wireless network—and half a decade after the
smartphone revolution put a series of pocket-size devices on that network—we
are seeing the dawn of an era when the most mundane items in our lives can talk
wirelessly among themselves, performing tasks on command, giving us data
we’ve never had before.”); Howard Baldwin, A Match Made Somewhere: Big
Data and the Internet of Things, FORBES (Nov. 24, 2014, 11:06 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/howardbaldwin/2014/11/24/a-match-made-somewherebig-data-and-the-internet-of-things/ (“[O]nce the Internet of Things gets rolling,
stand back. We’re going to have data spewing at us from all directions—from
appliances, from machinery, from train tracks, from shipping containers, from
power stations.”).
63
Kashmir Hill, Nest Hackers Will Offer Tool to Keep the Google-Owned
Company from Getting Users’ Data, FORBES (July 16, 2014, 9:25 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/07/16/nest-hack-privacy-tool/. Press
Release, Google, Google to Acquire Nest (Jan. 13, 2014), available at
https://investor.google.com/releases/2014/0113.html.

548

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 16: 527

with additional data, helps to fill out the picture of an individual.64
Google Glass—a wearable technology with Internet connectivity
and video and picture-taking capability—is another example. 65
Before Google recently discontinued the Google Glass Explorer
program, 66 Google Glass was combined with facial recognition
programs and apps such as NameTag.67 NameTag allows strangers
to immediately access a person’s name, photos, and dating website
profiles simply by looking at them.68 These capabilities of Google
Glass in conjunction with several other data-producing and
privacy-reducing features have led to some degree of public
backlash, as evidenced by the rise of the term “glasshole” in the
social vernacular, if nothing else.69 Furthermore, the development

64

As an additional, noteworthy security risk, researchers at the University of
Central Florida recently discovered that it was possible to take control of Nest
and secretly siphon off data from the Nest system. Hill, supra note 63; see also
David Perera, Smart Grid Powers Up Privacy Worries, POLITICO (Jan. 1, 2015,
9:00 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/01/energy-electricity-data-use113901.html.
65
See, e.g., Hayley Tsukayama, Everything You Need to Know About Google
Glass, WASH. POST (Feb, 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2014/02/27/everything-you-need-to-know-about-google-glass/.
66
See, e.g., Jennifer Booton, Why Google Glass Wasn’t a Failure, MARKETWATCH
(Jan. 30, 2015, 9:14 AM) http://www.marketwatch.com/ story/no-google-glasswasnt-a-failure-2015-01-29.
67
See generally NAMETAG, http://www.nametag.ws (last visited Jan. 31, 2015).
68
See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, Google Glass Facial Recognition App Draws Senator
Franken’s Ire, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2015, 5:23 PM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/
kashmirhill/2014/02/05/google-glass-facial-recognition-app-draws-senator-frankensire/.
69
Id.; Jat Singh & Julia Powles, The Internet of Things – The Next Big
Challenge to Our Privacy, GUARDIAN (July 28, 2014, 3:52 PM), http://www.
theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/28/internet-of-things-privacy; see also STOP
THE CYBORGS, http://ww.stopthecyborgs.org (last visited Aug. 21, 2014);
MICHAEL JUNGLING & PATRICK A. WOOD, MORGAN STANLEY RES., MEDICAL
DEVICES AND SERVICES (2014), available at http://www.sensium-healthcare.com/
sites/default/files/Pages%20from%20morgan_stanley_iot_april_2014.pdf (discussing
Sensium’s new wearable healthcare patch, data collection, and anonymization);
Rachel Metz, Google Glass is Dead; Long Live Smart Glasses, MIT TECH. REV.
(Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/532691/googleglass-is-dead-long-live-smart-glasses/ (describing the failures of the Glass
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of ubiquitous technologies and systems capable of tracking
individuals in real time through their cell phones and wearable
devices as a means of maximizing potential advertising efficacy
has already begun.70
The Internet of Things market is growing rapidly. A recent
study by the International Data Corporation estimates that the
Internet of Things market worldwide will be worth approximately
$7.1 trillion by 2020.71 Some estimates put the global number of
devices connected to the Internet around 6 billion; others estimate
that it will reach around 200 billion by 2020. 72 Economic
incentives entice increasing numbers of consumers to use devices
such as Progressive Insurance’s “Snapshot” program, which offers
automobile insurance rate reductions in exchange for the
installation of a vehicular tracking device that monitors driving
speed, time, and habits. As a result, some have argued that this
“unraveling of privacy” is creating unprecedented challenges to
existing privacy law, which was established primarily with an eye

marketing strategy, but concluding that the ubiquity of similar wearables is
inevitable).
70
See Stephanie Clifford & Quentin Hardy, Attention Shoppers: Store Is
Tracking Your Cell, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
07/15/business/attention-shopper-stores-are-tracking-your-cell.html?pagewanted=all;
Keith Wagstaff, New York City Nixes Advertising ‘Beacons’ in Telephone
Booths, NBC NEWS (Oct. 6, 2014, 4:27 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/
security/new-york-city-nixes-advertising-beacons-telephone-booths-n219281.
71
See Press Release, Int’l Data Corp., The Internet of Things Moves Beyond the
Buzz: Worldwide Market Forecast to Exceed $7 Trillion by 2020, IDC Says (June 3,
2014), available at http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140603005446/en/
Internet-Moves-Buzz-Worldwide-Market-Forecast-Exceed#.VN9qEPnF91Z;
Chowdry, supra note 6. But see Marco della Cava, Privacy Integral to Future of the
Internet of Things, USA TODAY (July 11, 2014, 3:27 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/tech/2014/07/10/internet-of-things-privacy-summit/12496613/ (stating that the
2020 market will be worth approximately $15 billion).
72
Stefan Ferber, How the Internet of Things Changes Everything, HARV. BUS.
REV. (May 7, 2013), http://blogs.hbr.org/2013/05/how-the-internet-of-things-cha/;
Mark Van Rijmenam, How the Internet of Things Will Make a Smart World—
Infographic, DATAFLOQ, https://datafloq.com/read/internet-of-things-will-makeour-world-smart-infographic/302 (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
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toward preventing uninvited intrusions as opposed to willful
surveillance as part of an economic transaction.73
Consumers should also not be surprised that the apps they
routinely download to smartphones and tablets often collect huge
swaths of information about them. 74 The permissions to which
consumers must agree as a prerequisite for the download or usage
of an app often function as a consumer’s consent to have their data
tracked and recorded. The Pew Research Group has identified an
ever-growing list of over 126 different permissions that apps
typically ask for, including a user’s location, browser history and
bookmarks, calendar events, contact data, cell phone bills, email
accounts, mapping applications, and hardware permissions that
allow an app to access or use, for instance, a device’s camera or

73

See Neil M. Richards, Symposium: Privacy and Technology: The Dangers
of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1940 (2013) (describing this
phenomenon as to the Progressive “MyRate” program); see also Snapshot
Privacy Statement, PROGRESSIVE.COM, http://www.progressive.com/auto/snapshotprivacy-statement/ (last updated Mar. 11, 2014).
74
See, e.g., Kenneth Olmstead, Mobile Apps Collect Information About Users,
With Wide Range of Permissions, PEW RESEARCH (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/04/29/mobile-apps-collect-information-aboutusers-with-wide-range-of-permissions/; see also Chloe Albanesius, Android
Flashlight App Shared User Data Without Permission, PC MAG. (Dec. 5, 2013,
2:50 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2427999,00.asp (describing
the Android Flashlight App’s practice of collecting user data and distributing
users’ personal information to third parties without users’ consent, and the
settlement with the Federal Trade Commission that followed); Julia Angwin &
Jeff Larson, FAQ About NSA’s Interest in Angry Birds and Other ‘Leaky Apps,’
PRO PUBLICA (Jan. 28, 2014, 1:30 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/faqabout-nsas-interest-in-angry-birds-and-other-leaky-apps (describing American and
British intelligence agencies’ widespread practice of targeting and hacking app
developers because of their veritable treasure troves of personal data on
individuals); What They Know – Mobile, WALL ST. J., http://blogs.wsj.com/wtkmobile/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2014) (part of an ongoing investigative series into
data privacy in which the Wall Street Journal analyzes the data collected by over
100 iPhone and Android apps, and describes what each app stated to users as to
the information being gathered).
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microphone surreptitiously. 75 Additional personal information is
voluntarily surrendered in the form of “loyalty programs” and
“customer rewards cards,” which companies use to track and
analyze user purchases and habits.76 There are already documented
instances of healthcare systems culling information gleaned from
these rewards programs and using it to proactively predict the
impact of certain buying patterns on an individual’s health.77
In the interest of fairness, and despite the unsettling overtones
of such constant monitoring, there are undoubtedly aspects of this
data collection that are not without their upside. After all, online
advertising and marketing practices are fueled by big data
analytics, and these industries effectively subsidize a tremendous
amount of activity online. 78 However, while many consumers
appear to be content with this “value for value” exchange, in which
75

Olmstead, supra note 74; see also Chris Smith, Facebook’s Android App
Wants to Do Strange Things to Your Phone, BGR (Mar. 6, 2014, 2:21 PM),
http://bgr.com/2014/03/06/facebook-android-app-permissions/.
76
See, e.g., Tom Groenfeldt, Sears Competes on Big Data and Loyalty
Programs, FORBES (May 2, 2012, 10:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
tomgroenfeldt/2012/05/02/sears-competes-on-big-data-and-loyalty-programs/; see
also Rajkumar Venkatesan, Big Data Is an Opportunity to Win More Customers,
WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
capitalbusiness/big-data-is-an-opportunity-to-win-more-customers/2014/08/15/
15a31396-2254-11e4-958c-268a320a60ce_story.html; Tom Brewster, Facebook,
Google, and Personal Data: What’s Your Worth?, BBC (May 12, 2014),
https://www.bbc.com/future/story/20140509-how-much-is-your-facebook-worth;
Ben Kepes, Is This the Final Straw? Uber’s Android Application—“Literally
Malware,” FORBES (Nov. 26, 2014, 6:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
benkepes/2014/11/26/is-this-the-final-straw-ubers-android-application-literallymalware/.
77
See Shannon Pettypiece & Jordan Robertson, Hospitals Are Mining Patients’
Credit Card Data to Predict Who Will Get Sick, BUS. WK. (July 3, 2014), http://www.
businessweek.com/articles/2014-07-03/hospitals-are-mining-patients-credit-carddata-to-predict-who-will-get-sick; see also Kelly Dilworth, Health Care Companies
Turn to Big Data, YAHOO FIN. (Aug. 14, 2014, 8:00 AM), https://finance.
yahoo.com/news/health-care-companies-turn-big-120000707.html; Joseph Walker,
Data Mining to Recruit Sick People, WALL. ST. J. (Dec. 17, 2013), http://
online.wsj.com/news/article_email/SB100014240527023037221045792401405
54518458-lMyQjAxMTA0MDAwNjEwNDYyWj.
78
WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 50.
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personal information is readily traded, there is merit in being
cognizant of the fact that the Internet is not “free.” As one
commentator recently put it, “[w]e have become the product.”79
B. The Value of Data
The reason for this seemingly endless collection of data is that
this data is proving to be extraordinarily valuable to data brokers,
advertisers, investigators, law enforcement agencies, and many
others. 80 In 2003, there were already more than one thousand
companies conducting data-mining activities on American
consumers.81 In 2012, data was a $300 billion per year industry
employing more than three million people in the United States
alone.82 Acxiom Corporation, for instance, sometimes described as
“the biggest company you’ve never heard of,”83 has been said to
have amassed the largest commercial database on consumers

79

Claire Porter, Little Privacy in the Age of Big Data, THE GUARDIAN (June
20, 2014, 12:19 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/20/littleprivacy-in-the-age-of-big-data; see also Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The
Online Market’s Consumer Preference Disconnect, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95,
96 (2013) (noting the failure of the data-for-services economy in part because
customers rarely know the cost, thus preventing them from making educated
purchase choices based on cost and desire as they would for any other product).
80
See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 41 (“Users,
more often than not, do not understand the degree to which they are a
commodity in each level of this marketplace.”); see also CUKIER BIG DATA,
supra note 4, at 98–122 (“The crux of data’s worth is its seemingly unlimited
potential for reuse.”); see also Ashkan Soltani et al., NSA Uses Google Cookies
to Pinpoint Targets for Hacking, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-topinpoint-targets-for-hacking/ (describing how the NSA piggybacks into users’
systems using private sector cookies).
81
Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy
Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U.L. REV. 63, 65 (2003)
(citing Robert O’Harrow, Data Firms Getting Too Personal?, WASH. POST,
Mar. 8, 1998, at A1).
82
Jason Morris & Ed Lavandera, Why Big Companies Buy, Sell Your Data,
CNN (Aug. 23, 2012, 8:52 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2012/08/23/tech/web/
big-data-acxiom/ (citing information from the McKinsey Global Institute).
83
Id.
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currently in existence.84 In 2012, Acxiom executives boasted that
their database contained information on more than a half billion
consumers—including a majority of adults in the United States—
with approximately 1,500 individual data points per person. 85
Intelius, Inc. provides its customers with background check and
public record information from a database containing more than
twenty billion records.86 PeekYou uses “patented technology that
analyzes content from over sixty social media sites, news sources,
homepages, and blog platforms to provide clients with detailed
consumer profiles.”87
In order to categorize consumers based on lifestyle, habits, and
preferences, some data brokers have identified individuals that fit
into certain discrete groups of their own creation, such as “Ethnic
Second-City-Strugglers,” “Retiring on Empty: Singles,” “Tough
Start: Young Single Parents,” “Credit Crunched: City Families,”
and “Rural and Barely Making It.”88 Additional categories include
“‘Rural Everlasting,’ which comprises single men and women over
the age of 66 with ‘low educational attainment and low net
worths,’” as well as “Expectant Parent,” “Diabetes Interest,” and
“Cholesterol Focus.”89
84

Natasha Singer, Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome, N.Y. TIMES
(June 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-thequiet-giant-of-consumer-database-marketing.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
85
Id. (“[Acxiom] peers deeper into American life than the F.B.I. or the I.R.S., or
those prying digital eyes at Facebook and Google. If you are an American adult,
the odds are that [Acxiom] knows things like your age, race, sex, weight, height,
marital status, education level, politics, buying habits, household health worries,
vacation dreams—and on and on.); see also Philip Bump, How Facebook Plans to
Become One of the Most Powerful Tools in Politics, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/11/26/how-facebook-plansto-become-one-of-the-most-powerful-tools-in-politics/ (describing the partnership
between Facebook and Acxiom in terms of amassing and analyzing individuals’
personal data for use in political campaigns).
86
FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at 9; see generally How We Do It, INTELLIUS,
http://corp.intelius.com (last visited Aug. 18, 2014).
87
FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at 9; see also PEEKYOU, http://www.peekyou.com
(last visited Aug. 18, 2014).
88
WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 44.
89
FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at v.
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The U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) recently
reported on one data broker that maintains detailed profiles on
specific consumers, cataloging ailments ranging from cancer and
diabetes to clinical depression and prostate problems.90 A 2013
Senate report “describes another data broker that keeps 75,000 data
elements about consumers in its system, including the use of yeast
infection products, laxatives, and OB/GYN services, among other
health-related data.”91 All of this collection takes place outside of
the regulatory scope of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), which governs patient privacy and
confidentiality.92 Furthermore, the recent shift amongst hospitals to
move to digital record keeping has likewise led to patient
records—presumably stripped of identifying information93—being
sold to third-party data-aggregation companies by the state
agencies with which hospitals share those records.94 Similarly, in
an effort apparently aimed at skirting certain provisions of the Fair
90

Julie Brill, Commissioner, FTC, Address at the Woodrow Wilson School of
Public and International Affairs, Princeton University: Big Data and Consumer
Privacy: Identifying Challenges, Finding Solutions, at 4, Feb. 20, 2014 (citing
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMM. ON
COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSP., U.S. SENATE, INFORMATION RESELLERS
CONSUMER PRIVACY FRAMEWORK NEEDS TO REFLECT CHANGES IN TECH. AND
THE MARKETPLACE 53 (2013)), available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_statements/202151/140220princetonbigdata_0.pdf
91
Id. at 4 (citing STAFF OF S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSP.,
113th CONG., A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY: COLLECTION, USE
AND SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR MARKETING PURPOSES 12, 14 (2013) (citing
documentary submission from Equifax and listing health care-related data
elements that Equifax maintains)).
92
Id.
93
See infra Part III.D (discussing the failures of anonymization).
94
See, e.g., Jordan Robertson, Your Medical Records Are for Sale, BUS. WK.
(Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-08-08/your-medicalrecords-are-for-sale; see also Jordan Robertson, States Hospital Data for Sale
Puts Privacy in Jeopardy, BLOOMBERG (June 5, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-05/states-hospital-data-for-sale-puts-privacy-injeopardy.html; Thomas Claburn, FTC: Data Brokers Know You Better Than Your
Mom Does, INFO. WK. (May, 28, 2014), https://www.informationweek.com/
mobile/mobile-business/ftc-data-brokers-know-you-better-than-mom-does/d/did/1269227?piddl_msgid=219930#msg_219930.
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Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), subprime mortgage and payday
lenders are using consumer profiles to identify vulnerable new
potential customers.95
There are also a growing number of instances of companies
using big data analytics to deploy differential pricing models
designed to target specific consumers for higher prices based on
their consumer profiles. 96 For instance, there are documented
examples of consumers paying different prices based on their
geographic location.97 An analysis of the online pricing practices of
Staples, Inc., by the Wall Street Journal, for instance, ironically
found that areas that had a higher average income tended to be able
to purchase a given item from Staples at a lower price.98 In the
same article, it was discovered that Office Depot “uses customers’
browsing history and geolocation to vary the offers and products it
displays to a visitor to its [web]site.” 99 Moreover, this type of
behavior is far from unusual. Amazon, Capital One, Discover
Financial Services, Orbitz, Lowe’s, and Rosetta Stone have all
employed big data analytics to vary pricing based on a given
consumer’s data profile. 100 Differential pricing has become of
particular use to companies operating in industries in which prices
vary substantially and often, such as in the hotel and airline
95

Nathan Newman, The Costs of Lost Privacy: Consumer Harm and Rising
Economic Inequality in the Age of Google, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 849, 857
(2014); see also FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at i; John Lippert, Lender Charging
390% Uses Data to Screen Out Deadbeats, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2014, 4:49 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-01/lender-charging-390-uses-data-toscreen-out-deadbeats.html.
96
See, e.g., Adam Tanner, Different Customers, Different Prices, Thanks to
Big Data, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
adamtanner/2014/03/26/different-customers-different-prices-thanks-to-big-data/;
see also Adam Ozimek, Will Big Data Bring More Price Discrimination?,
FORBES (Sept. 1, 2013, 10:48 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/modeledbehavior/
2013/09/01/will-big-data-bring-more-price-discrimination/.
97
Jennifer Valentino-Devries et al., Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on
Users’ Information, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424127887323777204578189391813881534.
98
Id.
99
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
100
Id.
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industries, as well as in industries in which costs and prices are
somewhat shrouded, such as in the insurance industry. More and
more, differential pricing is being routinely deployed against
consumers in the American marketplace.101
Given this framework, it is not surprising that some estimates
put the value of a single individual’s data profile upwards of
$5,000 per year. 102 It is perhaps for this reason that some
pro-consumer initiatives have developed in an effort to reclaim
one’s personal data. For instance, the Citizenme initiative seeks to
shift Internet power and economics back in the direction of
consumers by providing a long-term plan to facilitate the deliberate
sale of consumers’ personal information directly to specific buyers,
rather than having it clandestinely stripped by others.103 Essentially,
Citizenme is an app to which a user would link his or her
Facebook, Twitter, and other accounts.104 It then allows users to see
what data is shared on those networks, highlights particularly
alarming privacy policy provisions in red, and alerts users and
permits them to vote for or against changes made to privacy
policies and terms of service.105 Similarly, DataCoup empowers
101

Tanner, supra note 96; see generally Walter Baker et al., Using Big Data
to Make Better Pricing Decisions, MCKINSEY & CO. (June 2014) http://www.
mckinsey.com/insights/marketing_sales/using_big_data_to_make_better_pricing
_decisions (describing the process of using data to make more profitable pricing
decisions).
102
See, e.g., Newman, supra note 95, at 865–66 (citing Quentin Fottrell, Who
Would Pay $5,000 to Use Google? (You), MARKET WATCH (Jan. 25, 2012,
12:24 PM), http://blogs.marketwatch.com/realtimeadvice/2012/01/25/who-wouldpay-5000-to-use-google-you/?mg=blogs-sm.
103
See Klint Finley, The App That Lets You Spy on Yourself and Sell Your
Own Data, WIRED (July 9, 2014, 1:55 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/07/
citizenme/.
104
Id.
105
Id.; see also Stilgherrian, Big Data Is Just a Big, Distracting Bubble, Soon
to Burst, ZD NET (July 11, 2014), http://www.zdnet.com/big-data-is-just-a-bigdistracting-bubble-soon-to-burst-7000031480 (describing the Respect Network,
and the “Login with Respect” initiative); David Braue, Respect Network Marries
Security, Trust in Portable Cloud Data Push, CSO (July 9, 2014, 9:05 PM),
http://www.cso.com.au/article/549571/_respect_network_marries_security_trust_
portable_cloud_data_push/.
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willing consumers to aggregate, package, and sell their own
personal data, thus cutting out the data broker as an unnecessary
intermediary.106 Whether users will ultimately be willing to sell
their personal data to brokers and advertisers remains something of
an open question. Regardless, brokers are already selling users’
information to each other.
C. The Negotiation of Information
As one company gleans information, it is sold to another. Of
particular interest to attorneys is the trend represented by the
emergence of so-called “people search” products offered by data
brokers. 107 These products offer personal information about
individuals and are unique in that they are marketed for use by
individuals rather than businesses, advertisers, or corporations.108
These products are already capable of providing huge amounts of
information on a targeted individual, such as a given person’s
aliases, age and date of birth, news stories, telephone number, gender,
interests/affiliations, address history, education information, death
records, relatives, employment history, marriage records, email
address, criminal records, divorce records, civil records (including
bankruptcies, liens, judgments), property ownership and sales history
(including loan activity), social media information (including
usernames, profile URL, friend connections), [and] neighbors.109

The companies that provide people search products often perform
sophisticated web crawls across the Internet to gather information
106

See DATA COUP, https://datacoup.com/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2014); see
also Tom Simonite, Would You Let a Startup Track Your Social Media Accounts
and Credit Card Transactions in Exchange for Cash?, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb.
12, 2014), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/524621/sell-your-personaldata-for-8-a-month/; Tom Simonite, Datacoup Wants to Buy Your Credit Card
and Facebook Data, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.
technologyreview.com/news/530486/datacoup-wants-to-buy-your-credit-card-andfacebook-data/; Sam Harnett, How to Sell Your Private Data—If You Really
Want to, MARKETPLACE (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/
tech/how-sell-your-private-data-if-you-really-want.
107
FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at 52; see, e.g., INTELIUS, http://www.intelius.com
(last visited Aug. 18, 2014).
108
FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at 52.
109
See, e.g., id. at 53.
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on a given subject from publicly available sources and then
compare that data to data acquired from other data brokers to
gauge the accuracy of their information.110
Data brokers sell information to other data brokers,
governmental entities, utility and energy companies, hospitality
companies, individual consumers, insurance companies, lenders
and financial services firms, marketers, advertisers, pharmaceutical
companies, real estate services companies, telecommunications
firms, attorneys, investigators, and others.111 Indeed, as informal
discovery in civil litigation has become increasingly more
productive since the advent of the Internet, some have proactively
advocated for the increased use of data brokers’ products in
facilitating pre-trial adversarial investigation. 112 Moreover, as
110

Id. at 56.
Id. at 58. While the FTC report’s graphic breaking down the types of
products purchased by various industries indicates that currently attorneys and
investigators are generally only purchasing direct marketing services, it is
interesting to note that, as individual consumers frequently use people search
services, it may be nearly impossible to accurately ascertain who the end users
are of a given data broker product.
112
See, e.g., Todd B. Baker, Symposium: The Internet and the Law: Informal
Discovery on the Internet, 52 THE ADVOCATE 23, 27 (2010) (advocating for the
employment of Intelius’ services in conducting pretrial discovery); see also
Jayni Foley, Are Google Searches Private? An Originalist Interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment in Online Communication Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
447, 473 (2007) (“Data brokering companies now aggregate information on
individuals and sell it to both government and private litigants.”); Corey
Ciocchetti, The Privacy Matrix, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 245, 249 n.10 (2007)
(“For years, [data brokers] have made millions quietly selling personal
information to law enforcement, corporations, attorneys, collection agencies and
the news media.” (quoting Jill Burcum, Hackers’ Assaults May Prod Wave of
Reforms: Data-Selling Industry Comes Under Scrutiny, MINNEAPOLIS STAR
TRIBUNE, May 29, 2005, at A-1.)). “[M]any data-broker companies such as
ChoicePoint and LexisNexis profit from the sale of [personally identifiable
information].” Id.; see also Joseph T. Thai, Symposium: The Jurisprudence of
Justice Stevens: Panel I: Criminal Justice: Is Data Mining Ever a Search Under
Justice Stevens’ Fourth Amendment?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1731, 1751 (2006)
(“Credit card companies, banks, insurers, employers, landlords, attorneys,
detectives, angry spouses, and other private parties may avail themselves of the
services these data brokers offer.”).
111
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attorneys turn to the Internet and, increasingly, to social media to
conduct informal discovery, the practice becomes progressively
more accepted within the profession from an ethical standpoint,
with some even persuasively arguing that there exists an ethical
obligation upon attorneys to investigate an opponent’s social
networking information.113
Given these trends, taking the next step to the widespread
development of commercially available algorithms to be put to
work making deductions about human behavior, lifestyle, and
activities from consumers’ already available digital footprints is
not much of a stretch.114 If every link clicked indicates an interest;
every purchase made demonstrates a trait; and the sum total of
individuals’ data is being aggregated, bundled, and sold, the focus
must be this: what can one realistically do with all of that
information? The following section begins to answer this question.
III. THE WORLD OF BIG DATA
“Technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral.”115
There is no unified definition for the phenomenon that is “big
data.” Contemporary writers have defined it as “the ability of
society to harness information in novel ways to produce useful
insights or goods and services of significant value.”116 Others have

113

See, e.g., Steven C. Bennett, Ethical Limitations on Informal Discovery of
Social Media Information, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 473, 473–74 (2013).
114
See, e,g,, WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 44
(acknowledging the “powerful capacity on the part of the private sector to
collect information and use that information to algorithmically profile an
individual, possibly without that individual’s knowledge or consent[,]” and that,
if used “nefariously, could have significant ramifications for targeted
individuals”).
115
See James R. Hansen, Technology and the History of Aeronautics: An
Essay, U.S. CENTENNIAL OF FLIGHT COMM’N, http://www.centennialofflight.net/
essay/Evolution_of_Technology/Tech-OV1.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2015) (quoting
Melvin C. Kranzberg’s First Law of the History of Technology).
116
WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 2; see also Sean Fahey,
The Democratization of Big Data, 7 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 325, 325
(2014) (defining big data, somewhat frustratingly, “as a collection of data that is
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defined it as:
[A] generalized, imprecise term that refers to the use of large data sets
in data science and predictive analytics . . . . First, it refers to technology
that maximizes computational power and algorithmic accuracy.
Second, it describes types of analyses that draw on a range of tools to
clean and compare data. Third, it promotes the belief that large data
sets generate results with greater truth, objectivity, and accuracy.117

The recent White House Big Data Report correctly noted “most
definitions reflect the growing technological ability to capture,
aggregate, and process an ever-greater volume, velocity, and
variety of data.”118 Essentially, it is a field that applies algorithmic
computer processing tools and computer-assisted deductive
reasoning to extremely large datasets to make predictions and draw
rational conclusions from those datasets. This was not previously
possible until recent technological innovations both drove down
the costs of data storage and processing while increasing processing
power. As with any new and powerful technology, the tools of big
data may be harnessed to serve ends either noble—such as the
early identification of disease outbreaks—or nefarious.
A. Predictive Analytics & Deductive Reasoning
Like “big data,” the concept of “predictive analytics” is subject
to more than one accepted definition. Some have defined it, simply
enough, as “a new discipline that combines data with analysis to

so large that it exceeds one’s capacity to process it in an acceptable amount of
time with available tools”).
117
Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96 (2014)
(citations omitted).
118
WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 2; see also Svetlana
Sicular, Gartner’s Big Data Definition Consists of Three Parts, Not to Be
Confused With the Three V’s, FORBES (Mar. 27, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/gartnergroup/2013/03/27/gartners-big-data-definition-consists-ofthree-parts-not-to-be-confused-with-three-vs/ (describing the so-called “three V’s”
and defining “big data” as “high-volume, -velocity and -variety information
assets that demand cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing
for enhanced insight and decision making”).
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make predictions.”119 As massive amounts of data of all types can
now be collected and organized efficiently, highly accurate
predictions predicated on that data might now be drawn from the
patterns that emerge.120
Not so long ago, marketers, researchers, political analysts, and
others seeking to research a given problem or phenomenon would
use sampling data to arrive at a conclusion.121 For example, if
someone wanted to know more about the political preferences and
tendencies of a specific subcategory of the American population,
one would submit surveys to a “sample” of several hundred
individuals fitting the given demographic and then extrapolate
those results to the remaining population.122 This was a reasonable
and manageable method of studying a population and making
deductions when costs and practical difficulties prevented
researchers from researching or surveying all, or even most,
members of a given population. However, with the computing
power and storage capacity now available, it has become a
debatable issue whether sampling continues to possess its past
utility in the age of big data—why analyze only some of the data in
instances where we now possess the means and the wherewithal to
analyze all of the data?123 Despite considerable privacy concerns
119

John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How
Machine Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of
Legal Services, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3052 (2014); see also Crawford &
Schultz, supra note 117, at 98 (“By combining the use of these data sets with
predictive analytics, Big Data can dramatically increase the amount of related
data that may be considered private.”).
120
See McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 119.
121
See CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 23 (describing sampling as “an
outgrowth of an era of information-processing constraints”).
122
See Deepa Sankar, Sampling in the Age of Big Data, SAP (Dec. 11, 2013,
7:23 AM), http://scn.sap.com/community/business-intelligence/blog/2013/12/
11/sampling-in-the-age-of-big-data (noting that the typical national polling size
is somewhere between 1000 and 1500 participants, with a margin of error of +/three percentage points); see also CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 12–13
(“Since the nineteenth century, society has depended on using samples when
faced with large numbers.”).
123
See, e.g., CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 13 (“[T]he need for sampling
is an artifact of a period of information scarcity, a product of the natural
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and potential pitfalls for litigants, the newfound technological
capability to draw meaning from information that was practically
useless only a few decades ago has led to an astounding array of
practical applications, some of which have undeniable societal
value and utility.
Google Flu Trends, for example, “uses aggregated Google
search data to estimate flu activity” for specific geographic areas
and regions.124 Historically, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (“CDC”) have monitored flu pandemics in order for
public health agencies to properly respond as infections develop
and spread. 125 However, a lag time of several weeks or more
existed between an epidemic’s development in an area and the time
when the CDC would receive reports of that epidemic from
healthcare professionals and hospitals, delaying the CDC’s ability
to mount a timely response.126 Google, on the receiving end of
more than three billion search queries per day,127 found itself in a
unique position to speed the flu-recognition process. Given the
massive trove of data at its disposal, Google engineers wondered if
they could anticipate flu outbreaks and track them in real time by
analyzing Google search queries. In a 2009 paper published in the
scientific journal Nature, Google engineers reported that, by
comparing historical search terms with historical flu outbreak
information provided by the CDC, they could identify correlations
between a combination of forty-five specific search terms and flu

constraints on interacting with information in an analog era.”); see also Steven
Swoyer, Big Data Analytics and the End of Sampling as We Know It,
COMPUTER WEEKLY (Aug. 2012), http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/
Big-data-analytics-and-the-end-of-sampling-as-we-know-it.
124
See Flu Trends, GOOGLE, http://www.google.org/flutrends/ (last visited
Aug. 22, 2014); see also Schwartz & Solove, supra note 25, at 1868.
125
See generally Seasonal Influenza, CENT. FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
http://www.cdc.gov/flu (last visited Jul. 29, 2014) (providing a hub of resources
to help organizations combat flu outbreaks) .
126
See CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 1–2.
127
Dan Farber, Google Search Scratches Its Brain 500 Million Times a Day,
CNET (May 13, 2013, 6:16 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/google-searchscratches-its-brain-500-million-times-a-day/.
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outbreaks in discrete geographical regions.128 Thus, by analyzing
massive amounts of seemingly random data and comparing that
data against historically recorded phenomena, accurate predictions
could be made about disease trends in real time.
Consider also the possible utility of analyzing aggregated
locational data. Global Positioning System (“GPS”) technology
was opened to non-military uses in the 1980s and, coupled with the
steadily decreasing cost of producing GPS modules, has ultimately
led to the inclusion of GPS systems in everything from cell phones
and computers to the majority of new automobiles.129 Putting this
information to practical use and employing so-called “population
analytics,” a company called AirSage has a website that boasts,
“As long as a mobile phone is active on the cellular network,
AirSage receives wireless signals and uses them to anonymously
determine location. With AirSage’s carrier and partner
relationships, we have nationwide coverage—more than any other
location-based services (LBS) provider.”130 This information can
then be used to identify traffic congestion patterns, groups of
migrating protesters, or consumer shopping patterns, based on the
number of devices reporting in a given area.131
128

Jeremy Ginsberg et al., Detecting Influenza Epidemics Using Search
Engine Query Data, 457 NATURE 1012, 1014 (Feb. 2009); see also CUKIER BIG
DATA, supra note 4, at 2; Schwartz & Solove, supra note 25, at 1868.
129
See CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 88–89; see also Jaclyn Trop, The
Next Data Privacy Battle May Be Waged Inside Your Car, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/business/the-next-privacy-battle-maybe-waged-inside-your-car.html (describing so-called “black boxes,” which
“collect[] information like direction, speed and seatbelt use in a continuous loop.
It is in nearly every car today, and in September, it is set to become
mandatory.”).
130
AIRSAGE, How it Works, http://www.airsage.com/Technology/How-itworks/ (last visited Jan 3, 2015); see also Anton Troianovsky, Phone Firms Sell
Data on Customers, WALL ST. J., (May 21, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424127887323463704578497153556847658 (“Big phone
companies have begun to sell the vast troves of data they gather about their
subscribers’ locations, travels and web-browsing habits.”).
131
AIRSAGE, What We Do: See How People Move Through the Day,
http://www.airsage.com/Technology/What-we-do/ (last visited May 20, 2014);
see also CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 90–91.
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Despite the obvious ingenuity behind such an application of
GPS technology, there are also clear privacy implications.132 As
Justice Sotomayor recently stated in her concurring opinion in
United States v. Jones, “GPS monitoring generates a precise,
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects
a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional,
religious, and sexual associations.” 133 Though such locational
information, if perfectly and impenetrably anonymized, may well
pose only a small privacy risk to the individual, contemporary
research indicates with increasing consistency that true
anonymization is likely unattainable.134
Law enforcement agencies around the world have also begun
employing predictive analytic solutions to tailor specific crime
prevention strategies. For instance, Predpol (short for “predictive
policing”) claims to offer targeted, real-time crime prediction
designed for and successfully tested by officers in the field.135 By
forecasting likely future criminal activity in real-time, and basing
its calculations on the “times and locations of previous crimes,
combined with sociological information about criminal behavior
and patterns,” the PredPol program recently resulted in a 19%
reduction in burglaries in the Santa Cruz, California area; at the
time of its introduction, the city was facing a 30% increase in
132

See generally infra Part III.D.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“Disclosed in [GPS] data . . . will be trips the indisputably private
nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the
plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the
criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the
mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on.” (citing People v.
Weaver, 909 N.E. 2d 1195, 1199 (2009)).
134
See infra notes 150–61 and accompanying text.
135
PREDPOL.COM, http://www.predpol.com/ (last visited June 19, 2014); see
also How Predpol Works, PREDPOL.COM, http://www.predpol.com/how-predpolworks/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2013) (“Using only three data points—past type,
place and time of crime and a unique algorithm based on criminal behavior
patterns, PredPol’s powerful software provides each law enforcement agency
with customized crime predictions for the places and times that crimes are most
likely to occur.”).
133
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crime against a 20% decrease in police staff.136 IBM also has been
developing predictive policing software for several years now,
“using databases of past crimes and information like timing and
weather to identify trends and map out predictions.”137
B. The Power of Correlation
In order to understand how big data becomes meaningful
information through predictive analytics, it is first necessary to
discuss the distinction between correlation and causation. Big
Data, the recent collaboration by Viktor Mayer-Schonberger,
Professor of Internet Governance and Regulation at Oxford
University, and Kenneth Cukier’s, data editor for the Economist,
discusses the power and utility of correlative information, given a
large enough sample size, even in the absence of causative
understanding. 138 The Google Flu program, for instance, was
predicated on correlative data—the search query analysis did not
cause the flu patterns, or vice versa, but the presence of one gave
rise to a reasonable probability of the existence of the other.139
As an example of this phenomenon, Mayer-Schonberger and
Cukier recount the experiences of researchers at the University of
Ontario Institute of Technology. Working in conjunction with IBM,
the researchers used software to capture patient vital signs—heart
rate, blood oxygen levels, and others—in real time. Ultimately,
they collected over a thousand data points per second to detect and
record subtle changes in the condition of premature babies to
detect the onset of health complications and infections in instances
where a physician would be incapable of making such a
deduction. 140 The information reveals predictable commonalities
among infant patients, which occur just prior to the deterioration of
a patient’s condition. As Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier readily
point out, this method is not diagnostic and thus does not illustrate
136

Heather Kelly, Police Embracing Tech That Predicts Crimes, CNN (May
26, 2014, 7:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/09/tech/innovation/police-tech/.
137
Id.
138
See generally CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 90–91.
139
Id. at 53.
140
Id. at 59–60.
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why the infant patients are headed for trouble, only that they are.141
Thus, by using computers to detect biological signals common to
ailing infants, healthcare workers are able to timely allocate
personnel and resources to monitor a patient that the data indicates
is at risk, even in the absence of a complete understanding as to
why he or she is at risk.142
This is the nature of correlative study: the use of thousands of
data points, often studied against the backdrop of actual past
events, to create predictive models of high probabilities.143 The
aforementioned examples of using massive quantities of data for
such diverse purposes as monitoring real-time traffic patterns and
predicting health failures through the analysis of thousands upon
thousands of data points pertaining to an individual’s vital signs
offer a brief glimpse of the power of deduction when one possesses
enough information on a given subject. Now, given the preceding
examples, one must consider the uses to which data brokers,
investigators, law enforcement, attorneys, and others could put the
massive datasets that result from the wide scale data collection
efforts discussed in Part II. The question then becomes whether
and to what extent datasets can be linked to a particular person and
used to make deductions about that person’s traits, habits, medical
conditions, political opinions, finances, sexual orientation,
psychological conditions, and on and on. The power of aggregated
data to identify specific individuals and to identify specific
characteristics about them is discussed below.144

141

Id. at 60; see also Brill, supra note 90, at 1.
See also Achieving Small Miracles from Big Data, IBM, https://www.
ibm.com/smarterplanet/global/files/ca__en_us__healthcare__smarter_healthcare_
data_baby.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2014) (describing the Artemis project).
143
See CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 68 (“Big data turbocharges noncausal analyses, often replacing causal investigations.”). But see WHITE HOUSE
BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
144
See, e.g., Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face Is Exposed for AOL
Searcher No. 4417749, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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C. The Power of Deduction: Identification, Behavior, and Propensities
Part of the basic thesis herein—and, indeed, part of the nature
of predictive analytics insofar as studying human behavior and
characteristics are involved—is that the more information one has
on a given individual, the more varied, accurate, and detailed
predictions and deductions one can make about that individual.145
In what is now a widely reported example of big data’s ubiquity
and potential for invasiveness, in 2002 a statistician employed by
Target was at work at his desk when two colleagues stopped by
and proposed a question: “If we wanted to figure out if a customer is
pregnant, even if she didn’t want us to know, can you do that?”146
The desire to ascertain this information was simple—newly
pregnant moms are looked upon as “holy grails” to marketers.147
This is because research indicates that individuals develop buying
habits over time, and those habits are only probable to change upon
the occurrence of certain discrete life events, one of the most
significant of which is the birth of a child.148
Target researchers had discovered that expectant mothers
exhibit a number of regular, predictable buying habits. For
instance, while lotion is a common purchase among consumers,
expectant mothers by and large purchase unscented lotions, and in
great quantities, generally around the beginning of the second
trimester.149 A careful retroactive analysis of the company’s baby
shower registry further showed specific and predictable times at
which expectant mothers purchased zinc, calcium and magnesium
supplements, hand sanitizer, and an array of other products.150
Armed with this information, based upon a woman’s buying
patterns, the statistician was able to create a formula through which
145

See, e.g., infra notes 159–61 and accompanying text.
Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?
pagewanted=1&_r=1&hp.
147
Id. at 1 (“Their [newly pregnant moms’] shopping patterns and brand
loyalties are up for grabs.”).
148
Id.
149
Id. at 6.
150
Id.
146
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Target was able to deduce with shocking reliability whether a
woman was pregnant, as well as the date of conception, and her due
date, in order to timely target the woman with key advertisements
as her pregnancy progressed.151 This practice ultimately received
some press attention when it culminated in an irate father storming
into a Minneapolis-area Target and demanding an explanation as to
why his unmarried teenage daughter was receiving mailers for
baby clothes and cribs, only to ultimately apologize to the store
manager after returning home to learn of his daughter’s unplanned
pregnancy.152 Target knew that the man’s daughter was pregnant
before he did.
Returning for a moment to the application of predictive
analytical models to crime prevention, the previous section
touched upon predictive policing, generally, in terms of identifying
where and when crimes are likely to transpire based on a historical
analysis of the data. However, law enforcement agencies are also
applying big data analytics to identify specific individuals whom
the data indicates warrant additional scrutiny.153 For instance, the
city of Chicago recently used predictive analytics to develop a list
of several hundred individuals who fit a demonstrated “profile” for
having a propensity for violent criminality.154 By shifting the focus
from geography to identity, and by identifying large numbers of
variables that are consistent amongst violent criminals, law
enforcement officers are identifying persons for whom they have a
“heightened awareness” based on “factors beyond charges and
convictions.”155 While it is presently unclear to what extent these
151

Id.
Id. at 7.
153
Although the Fourth Amendment implications of making surveillance and
investigation decisions based on the development of data profiles are obviously
tremendous, this issue is beyond the scope of the instant article. For further
reading, see WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 28–31.
154
See id. at 31 (citing Andrew G. Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive
Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2394683; Predictive Policing
Res., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.nij.gov/topics/lawenforcement/strategies/predictive-policing/Pages/research.aspx).
155
WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 37.
152
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techniques will be used moving forward, let alone sanctioned by
the courts from a Fourth Amendment perspective, the Minority
Report overtones have not gone unnoticed by either technology
writers or privacy advocates.156
Programs employing this technology have already been
deployed in communities around the country. For instance, a
majority of state parole boards now use predictions grounded in
data analysis as a factor in determining whether an inmate should
be paroled.157 Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security’s
Future Attribute Screening Technology (“FAST”) project analyzes
vital signs, physiological patterns, and the like to identify those
who are about to commit crimes.158 Intelius, one of the nation’s
largest data brokers with access to over 600 million criminal case
records and over 40 million defendant records, has already
produced programs that use thousands of criminal records and
combine that information with everything from gender, eye, and
skin color, to traffic ticket histories and seemingly insignificant
data such as an individual’s tattoos to create algorithms used to
arrive at a probability of an individual’s engagement in criminal
activity.159
156

See Yaniv Mor, Big Data and Law Enforcement: Was “Minority Report”
Right?, WIRED (Mar. 5, 2014, 12:25 PM), http://www.wired.com/2014/03/bigdata-law-enforcement-minority-report-right/; see also CUKIER BIG DATA, supra
note 4, at 157–58. See Minority Report (Amblin Entm’t 2002) (telling the story
in which a Washington, D.C., police department develops a “PreCrime” system
wherein criminals are clairvoyantly identified, apprehended, sentenced, and
jailed prior to having broken the law).
157
CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 158; see also Prison Breakthrough:
Big Data Can Help States Decide Whom to Release from Prison, THE ECONOMIST
(Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21601009-big-datacan-help-states-decide-whom-release-prison-prison-breakthrough; Attorney General
Eric Holder’s Speech at the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers 57th
Annual Meeting and 13th State Criminal Justice Network Conference (Aug. 1,
2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2014/ag-speech140801.html (discussing the potential pitfalls of employing big data analytics at
criminal sentencings).
158
Mor, supra note 156.
159
Jordan Robertson, How Big Data Could Help Identify the Next Felon—Or
Blame the Wrong Guy, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 15, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.
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The accuracy of the software depends on the number of false positives
one is willing to tolerate, a range that [Jim] Adler[, former chief
privacy officer at Intelius] calls the “anarchy to tyranny” spectrum. At
its most aggressive, his program can correctly identify all 51,246 felons
[in his sample set] while misidentifying 2,220 non-felons, numbers an
iron-fisted ruler could live with. At a more lenient setting, it can
correctly identify 37,842 felons while misidentifying 152
non-felons[.]160

Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) recently
developed the first department-wide big data capability: the dual
pilot programs Neptune and Cerberus. 161 Neptune serves as a
massive “data lake” into which information from an array of
sources flows and is retained.162 As unclassified data is fed into
Neptune, the data is tagged and sorted before being fed into
Cerberus, which adds classified information to the mix.163 These
programs provide the ability for investigators to, among other
things, “perform person and characteristic searches while
investigating a crime.”164
The deductions that are possible are limited only by the amount
of data that is available and the creativity of those mining it. For
instance, recent scholarship demonstrates that an analysis of a
user’s Facebook “likes” “can be used to automatically and
accurately predict a range of highly sensitive personal attributes
including: sexual orientation, ethnicity, religious and political
views, personality traits, intelligence, happiness, use of addictive

bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-14/how-big-data-could-help-identify-the-next-felonor-blame-the-wrong-guy.html.
160
Id.
161
WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 27.
162
Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PRIVACY IMPACT
ASSESSMENT FOR THE NEPTUNE PILOT (Sept. 25, 2013), available at http://www.
dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-dhs-wide-neptune-09252013.pdf;
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE
CERBERUS PILOT (Nov. 22, 2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/privacy-pia-dhs-cerberus-nov2013.pdf).
163
WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 27 n.69.
164
Id. at 28.
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substances, parental separation, age, and gender.”165 While many in
the private sector have emphasized there is no reason for concern
regarding private sector data collection because of policies which
dictate that collected data is to be “anonymized,” recent research
has brought that claim into question.
D. The Myth of Anonymization
While the privacy policies of many websites and Internet
services state that they will only share non-personally identifiable
information166—data which cannot be used to indicate an individual’s
identity—the processes of “de-identification” of aggregated data are
becoming less and less effective as re-identification strategies
prove to be more and more successful.167 A recent White House
report, for instance, stated:
As techniques like data fusion make big data analytics more powerful,
the challenges to current expectations of privacy grow more serious. When
data is initially linked to an individual or device, some privacy-protective
technology seeks to remove this linkage, or “de-identify” personally
identifiable information—but equally effective techniques exist to pull
the pieces back together through “re-identification.” Similarly, integrating
diverse data can lead to what some analysts call the “mosaic effect,”
165

Michael Kosinski et al., Private Traits and Attributes Are Predictable
From Digital Records of Human Behavior, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD.
OF SCIENCES (Feb. 12, 2013), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/110/
15/5802.full.pdf.
166
See, e.g., Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/
privacy/ (last modified Mar. 31, 2014) (stating that it may share “aggregated,
non-personally identifiable information publicly and with [its] partners—like
publishers, advertisers, or connected sites”); see also Privacy & Terms: Key
Terms, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/key-terms/#tocterms-info (last visited May 29, 2014) (defining “non-personally identifiable
information” as “information that is recorded about users so that it no longer
reflects or references an individually identifiable user”).
167
See WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 8 (citing HARVARD
LAW PETRIE-FLOM CTR., ONLINE SYMPOSIUM ON THE LAW, ETHICS, & SCIENCE OF
RE-IDENTIFICATION DEMONSTRATIONS, PCAST REPORT, BIG DATA AND PRIVACY
(2013), available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2013/05/13/onlinesymposium-on-the-law-ethics-science-of-re-identification-demonstrations/) “Many
technologists are of the view that de-identification of data as a means of protecting
individual privacy is, at best, a limited proposition.” Id.
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whereby personally identifiable information can be derived or inferred
from datasets that do not even include personal identifiers, bringing
into focus a picture of who an individual is and what he or she likes.168

Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier reached a similar conclusion,
ultimately finding that “[g]iven enough data, perfect anonymization
is impossible no matter how hard one tries.”169
In 2006, AOL intentionally released the search queries of
658,000 subscribers to the public for research purposes.170 Although
no names or user IDs were released, AOL assigned individual
accounts unique “identification numbers,” not dissimilar from the
IP addresses that identify each unique Internet connection or the
identification numbers assigned to many first- and third-party
cookies.171 However, it was apparent almost immediately that even
a novice researcher could deduce extremely intimate details from
such information, including a specific user’s identity, in short
order.172
Two New York Times reporters at the time took it upon
themselves to attempt to ascertain an individual’s identity from his
or her search queries alone. User number 4417749 conducted several
168

Id. (emphasis added).
CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 155 (“Researchers have recently shown
that not only conventional data but also the social graph—people’s connections with
one another—is vulnerable to de-anonymization.”). Compare Ann Cavoukian &
Daniel Castro, Big Data and Innovation, Setting the Record Straight: De-Identification
Does Work, PRIVACY BY DESIGN (June 16, 2014), http://www.privacybydesign.ca/
content/uploads/2014/06/pbd-de-identification_ITIF1.pdf, with Arvin Narayanan &
Edward W. Felten, No Silver Bullet: De-Identification Still Doesn’t Work,
RANDOM WALKER (July 9, 2014), http://randomwalker.info/ publications/nosilver-bullet-de-identification.pdf.
170
Dawn Kawamoto & Elinor Mills, AOL Apologizes for Release of User
Search Data, CNET (Aug. 7, 2006, 2:30 PM), http://news.cnet.com/AOLapologizes-for-release-of-user-search-data/2100-1030_3-6102793.html.
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Id.
172
See id. (illustrating the personal nature of something as seemingly benign
as a given person’s search history, one search log included queries for “how to
tell your family you’re a victim of incest;” “casey middle school;” “surgical help
for depression;” “can you adopt after a suicide attempt;” “Fishman David Dr. –
2.6 miles NE – 160 E 34th St, New York 10016 – (212) 731-5345;” and
“gynecology oncologists in new york city,” among others.).
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hundred searches over the three-month period for which data was
available, for topics such as “numb fingers,” “60 single men,” and
“dog that urinates on everything.” 173 Unaided by sophisticated
algorithms or computer-assisted analytical tools, the reporters
quickly found that as more and more pieces of information were
analyzed, the easier it became to establish the user’s identity.174
Additional searches were conducted for “landscapers in Lilburn,
Ga,” as well as searches for several people with the last name
Arnold and “homes sold in shadow lake subdivision gwinnett
county Georgia [sic].” 175 This data trail led quickly to Thelma
Arnold, a 62-year-old widow who makes her home in Lilburn,
Georgia.176 Indeed, the personal nature of one’s casual Internet
activity is not to be underestimated. “Foods to avoid when breast
feeding,” “calorie counting,” “how to kill oneself by natural gas,”
“child porno,” “termites,” “the best season to visit Italy,” “fear that
spouse contemplates cheating,” and “depression and medical
leave” are just a very few examples of the many more hundreds of
thousands of search queries detailed in the Times article.177
173

Barbaro & Zeller, supra note 144.
See also CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 157 (“In order to fully
investigate an individual, analysts need to look at the widest possible penumbra
of data that surrounds the person—not just whom they know, but whom those
people know too, and so on.”).
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Barbaro & Zeller, supra note 144.
176
Id.
177
Id. There is already empirical evidence that the pervasive tracking of
Internet activity, by both private entities as well as government bodies such as
the National Security Administration (NSA), is having a worldwide speech
chilling effect. A recent paper by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s
Catherine Tucker and Alex Matthews, entitled Government Surveillance and
Internet Search Behavior, details the changes in Internet activity across
populations globally in response to the June 2013 revelations that the NSA has
been cooperating with major tech companies such as Microsoft, Google, and
Yahoo! to obtain real-time data content on individual users. See Alex Matthews
& Catherine Tucker, Government Surveillance and Internet Search Behavior
(Mar. 24, 2014), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2412564. By using Google Trends to investigate 282 search terms—the search
terms used in the study derived from a list of search terms that DHS tracks on
social media sites, Google’s top 50 search terms for 2013, and other potentially
embarrassing search terms—the researchers discovered a measurable decrease in
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Data brokers already sell data profiles on individuals to
consumers of all types. They already comb the Internet for
information, and purchase information from first- and third-party
websites, and from one another. Given the ability of private
companies to collect personal information ranging from what type
of cologne a person bought their grandfather last Christmas to
whether or not that person has herpes, as well as the emergence of
the developing field of predictive analytics, the ability to create
increasingly detailed data profiles on individuals grows by the day.
As the products offered by data brokers become more
sophisticated, accurate, and invasive moving forward, the value of
this information to attorneys and their clients should not be
underestimated. In the current, largely unregulated, environment,
where personal information is readily sold as a commodity, the risk
that such personal information will someday be used against a
person increases with each day that passes, each transfer of
personal data between parties, and each click and keystroke. As
such, the only true protection a person has is to limit the
information that he or she volunteers to the world, to the best that
they are able. Furthermore, and perhaps most troubling, as
discussed below, the only true restraints on the industry are
self-imposed.
IV. THE CURRENT LEGAL AND REGULATORY LANDSCAPE
As new technologies have emerged and forced the law to
adapt, privacy law in the United States has historically been greatly
influenced by public opinion. For instance, in the Supreme Court’s

the frequency of searches for both search terms which were either potentially
embarrassing or likely to be flagged by the NSA. Id. at 3. These search terms
run the gamut of everything from “abortion” and “Accutane” to “flu” and “dirty
bomb.” Id. at 33–37. While the First Amendment implications are immediately
apparent given the presence of empirical data demonstrating self-censorship in
response to governmental surveillance, while also acknowledging that the issue
of government partnership with, and hacking of, private companies to facilitate
mass data collection further complicates the matter, such considerations are
beyond the scope of this Article.

MAR. 2015]

Big Data & the Duty of Competence

575

1928 decision in Olmstead v. United States,178 the Court held that the
practice of wiretapping phone lines did not infringe upon an individual’s
Fourth Amendment rights.179 Olmstead essentially permitted law
enforcement officers to listen in on citizens’ telephone calls with
impunity. Then, in 1967, the Supreme Court set forth the reasonable
expectation of privacy test in Katz v. United States,180 and found
that “one who occupies it, [a telephone booth] shuts the door
behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is
surely entitled to assume that his conversation is not being
intercepted.”181 This was the result of changes in public attitudes
about privacy, as well as technological developments in the
intervening years between Olmstead and Katz that helped to bring
about a change in public sentiment, which together effected a
change in the constitutionally-protected status of Americans’
telephone conversations.182 These decisions are noteworthy in that
they together demonstrate the phenomenon of slow-moving sea
changes in the way a society and, accordingly the law, views
complex and emerging issues that collide at the intersection of law
and technology.
There may never be a Katz moment for the Internet, wherein
the High Court sweeps down to protect the rights and privacy of all
Internet users. Indeed, attorneys charged with safeguarding the
interests of their clients must assume that there never will be.
Moreover, issues of user consent, difficulties in determining data
ownership, the international nature of the Internet, implicit
constitutional questions about individual rights, and additional
complications not yet thought of may ultimately prove too
problematic for a comprehensive piece of legislation or a single
Supreme Court decision to address all attendant privacy
178

277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Id. at 466.
180
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
181
Id. at 361 (internal quotation omitted).
182
See Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV.
1335, 1362–70 (1992) (describing the years following Katz, technological
advances in surveillance capabilities, and changing social and political ideas
about privacy).
179
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concerns.183 Nevertheless, the attorney’s duty to provide competent
representation remains, regardless of whether the law is able to
keep pace with technology.
The protection of one’s digital data privacy in the United States
is grounded in principles of contract and tort law and subject to
very little regulation. 184 Actions sounding in privacy or tort,
however, have enjoyed little successful application to online data
collection, in no small part because the privacy policies deployed
by most websites and digital services currently operate as blanket
customer consent forms to use an individual’s personal data as the
holders of that data see fit.185 Thus, tort and contract remedies, as
well as actions under the few applicable federal statutes, have had
little practical success for parties aggrieved by private sector data
collection practices.
A. Privacy Policies & The Problem of Consent
The privacy policies of virtually all websites and Internet
services describe, generally in the vaguest possible terms, what
data is collected and what uses are made of the data that the user
consents to share by using that website. 186 This “notice and
183

See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT supra note 4 n.9 (“Harvard
Professor of Science & Technology Studies Sheila Jasanoff argues that framing
the policy implications of big data is difficult precisely because it manifests in
multiple contexts that each call up different operative concerns, including big
data as property (who owns it); big data as common pool resources (who
manages it and on what principles); and big data as identity (it is us ourselves,
and thus its management raises constitutional questions about rights).”).
184
See Lori Chiu, Drawing the Line Between Competing Interests: Strengthening
Online Data Privacy Protection in an Increasingly Networked World, 14 SAN
DIEGO INT’L L. J. 281, 282–83 (2013) (citing Carolyn Hoang, In the Middle:
Creating a Middle Road Between U.S. and EU Data Protection Policies, 32 J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUD. 810, 818 (2012)); see also Klinefelter, supra note
25, at 19.
185
See, e.g., Deering v. CenturyTel, Inc., No. cv-10-63-BLG-RFC, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 51930 (D. Mont. May 16, 2011); In re Google, Inc., Privacy Policy
Litig., No. C-12-1382-PSG, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171124, at *39–44, *49–51
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013); see generally infra Part IV.A.
186
See, e.g., Privacy Policy, FOX NEWS, http://www.foxnews.com/about/
privacy-policy (effective as of Jul. 1, 2013) (“By using Fox News Services, you
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consent” model has been a central tenet of modern privacy law that
has permitted individuals to determine the manner and
circumstances in which their personal information may be shared.187
Not surprisingly, defenses predicated on users’ consent have
already been successfully deployed to claims mounted against data
collectors under both tort theories and violations of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”).188
agree to the terms and conditions of this Privacy Policy.”) The policy further
states that Fox News and its service providers collect registration information,
public information and posts, information from social media, and activity
information, including, for instance, IP address, browser type, geolocation data,
and other information. Id. It also notes that Fox News does “not respond to
browser ‘Do Not Track’ signals, as we await the work of interested stakeholders
and others to develop standards for how such signals should be interpreted.” Id.;
see also Full Privacy Policy, NBC UNIVERSAL, http://www.nbcuni.com/privacy/
full-privacy-policy/#what_information_do_we_collect_and_how_is_it_used (last
updated May 30, 2014) (“By using the online services, you expressly consent to
our collection, use, disclosure, and retention of your personal information as
described in this Privacy Policy.”) NBC’s policy further describes the collection
of information such as name, home address, age, gender, phone number, email
address, payment information, photos or videos of users, information about
one’s Internet connection, transaction information, “pages that you visit within
the online services, gameplay data or other information collected through
Cookies and Tracking Technologies[,]” and information collected from social
networks and other publicly available data. Id. The NBC Universal policy goes
on to state that they may “from time to time transfer your personal information
to other countries and make it accessible to any of our affiliates and third-party
service providers internationally.” Id.; see also Privacy Policy, BUZZFEED,
http://www.buzzfeed.com/about/privacy (last visited Jul. 30, 2014) (describing
its data collection practices, and then stating that, “[i]n some cases, we may
choose to buy or sell assets. In these types of transactions, user information,
including Personal Information, is typically one of the transferred business
assets”).
187
See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 49 (describing
the notice and consent model as “the core tenet of modern privacy protection
. . . that has been in wide use since the 1970s); CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4,
at 173 (“For decades an essential principle of privacy laws around the world has
been to put individuals in control by letting them decide whether, how, and by
whom their personal information may be processed.”).
188
See, e.g., Deering, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51930, at *1 (presenting a case
in which the plaintiff sued after the defendant-Internet service provider’s
collected and diverted its customers’ Internet communications to third parties,
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A related problem is the scope of consent. Privacy policies are
broadly written so that they may be broadly construed, in large part
because most companies in the business of collecting data today
have no idea to what use that data could be put in the future. A
great deal of the value offered by huge datasets comes as a
consequence of secondary uses, sometimes only discovered
months or years after the data was first collected. As a result,
providing adequate notice to consumers becomes less and less
realistic.189 Indeed, many are coming to what should have been the
obvious conclusion that the focus of most websites’ privacy
policies is on protecting data collection practices rather than the
privacy of users and visitors.190 Moreover, the lingering question
remains insofar as to what meaningful consent actually exists when
recent research indicates that at least one Americans in every two
erroneously believes that a privacy policy “ensures that the
company keeps confidential all the information it collects on
users.”191
A related problem to the scope of consent is the frequency with
which companies amend their terms and conditions and privacy
policies regarding data collection. The privacy policies of many
major websites and services are amended so often that other
website services have sprung up for the sole purpose of monitoring
changing website terms and conditions.192 In December 2014, for
and the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims
under the ECPA, as well as the claims for invasion of privacy, based on the
plaintiff’s “consent”); see also infra Part IV.B.
189
CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 173.
190
See, e.g., Jose Pagliery, What You Really Agree to When You Click ‘Accept,’
CNN MONEY (May 19, 2014, 9:15 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/19/
technology/security/privacy-policy/index.html (describing most website privacy
policies as “unintelligible”); see generally Terms and Conditions May Apply
(Hyrax Films 2013).
191
Aaron Smith, Half of Online Americans Don’t Know What a Privacy
Policy Is, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2014/12/04/half-of-americans-dont-know-what-a-privacy-policy-is/.
192
See Pagliery, supra note 190; see, e.g., TOSBACK, https://tosback.org/ (last
visited Aug. 23, 2014); TERMS OF SERVICE; DIDN’T READ, http://www.tosdr.org
(last visited Aug. 23, 2014).
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instance, the website tosback.org, a terms of service tracking
collaboration between the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 193 the
Internet Society,194 and ToS;DR (which is itself a tongue-in-cheek
shorthand for “Terms of Service; Didn’t Read”),195 reported over
forty significant changes in the terms of service or privacy policies
of major websites, including Google, Gmail, Yahoo, LinkedIn,
Youtube, and Flickr, among others.196 While, arguably, these constant
alterations should diminish the legal efficacy of employing user
consent as a defense to suits brought by consumers seeking to
prevent companies’ data collection practices, there is little
evidence to support that such arguments are having any success.
Facebook’s data use policy, for instance states, “We receive
data about you whenever you use or are running Facebook[.]”197 It
further states, “We receive data whenever you visit a game,
application, or website that uses Facebook Platform or visit a site
with a Facebook feature . . . .” 198 It goes on to state that “an
advertiser may tell us information about you,” and “[w]hen we get
your GPS location, we put it together with other location
information we have about you . . . .”199 Similarly, Twitter’s privacy
policy states,
When you use our Services, we may receive information (“Log Data”)
such as your IP address, browser type, operating system, the referring
web page, pages visited, location, your mobile carrier, device
information (including device and application IDs), search terms, and
cookie information . . . . We may revise this Privacy Policy from time
to time . . . . If we make a change to this policy that, in our sole
discretion, is material, we will notify you . . . .200

193

ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/ (last visited May 22, 2014).
INTERNET SOCIETY, http://www.internetsociety.org/ (last visited May 22, 2014).
195
TERMS OF SERVICE; DIDN’T READ, http://tosdr.org/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2014).
196
See TOSBACK, https://tosback.org (last visited Aug. 23, 2014).
197
Data Use Policy à Information We Receive about You, FACEBOOK, http://
www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info (last visited Jan. 4, 2015).
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER, twitter.com/privacy (last visited Jan. 4,
2015).
194
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Not surprisingly, Google’s Terms of Service states that by using
Google’s services, you agree to its terms.201 Google’s privacy policy
then states that Google “may share aggregated, non-personally
identifiable information publicly and with [its] partners[;]” that
Google “will share personal information with companies, organizations
or individuals outside of Google if [it has] a good-faith belief that
access, use, preservation or disclosure of the information is reasonably
necessary to” comply with any legal process or enforceable
governmental request; and that “[i]f your Google Account is
managed for you by a domain administrator (for example, for
Google Apps users) then your domain administrator and resellers
who provide user support . . . will have access to your Google
Account information (including your email and other data).”202 In
the face of such user agreements, it is difficult to determine exactly
which information, if any, users have not consented to disclosing.
From the consumer’s perspective, the lack of an available common
law cause of action capable of deterring the collection of one’s
data is compounded by the somewhat vacuous state of legislation
currently in place at the federal level.203
B. Federal Law & Data Privacy
At present, information privacy law in the United States is
governed by a random assortment of federal and state statutes
which focus on very specific areas—such as healthcare, credit
reporting, and video rental records, among others—rather than by

201

Terms of Service, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/
?fg=1 (last modified Apr. 14, 2014).
202
Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/
?fg=1 (last modified Dec. 19, 2014).
203
It should be noted that, while there have been some efforts by states to
craft effective legislation in this area, it has focused primarily on beefing up
consumer protections in the event of data breaches. See, e.g., Florida
Information Protection Act of 2014, Fla. S.B. 1524 (2014), available at https://
www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2014/1524/BillText/er/PDF. But see Cal. Assembly
Bill No. 2306 (Sept. 30, 2014), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/
faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB2306 (seeking to expand the scope
of California’s invasion of privacy statute to permit broader consumer protections).
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any uniform legislative act or regulatory body. 204 Generally
speaking, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”)
of 1986 is still the primary piece of federal legislation affecting
data privacy.205 However, the ECPA was passed at a time when it
was not uncommon for a person to pull over one’s car to use a
payphone after one’s pager went off. 206 In short, the statute is
woefully inadequate and antiquated.

204

See Solove, supra note 24, at 1440–44 (describing the FCRA, the Privacy
Act of 1974, The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA),
the Cable Communications Policy Act (CCPA) of 1984, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), the Video Privacy Protection Act of
1988, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, the Driver’s Privacy
Protection Act of 1994, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) of 1996, and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)
of 1998, and concluding that, rather than following, for instance, the footsteps of
the European Union in adopting large-scale privacy protections, “Congress has
passed a series of statutes narrowly tailored to specific privacy problems”);
Devin W. Ness, Note: Information Overload: Why Omnipresent Technology and
the Rise of Big Data Shouldn’t Spell the End for Privacy as We Know It, 31
CARDOZO ARTS & ENTM’T L.J. 925, 944 (2013). (citing Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–81(u); ECPA of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522,
2701-2712, 3121–3127; Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; Right to Financial Privacy
Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422; Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, 47 U.S.C. 521–573; and Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2710 (additional citations omitted)) (discussing Congress’ historically piecemeal
and seemingly arbitrary approach to privacy legislation).
205
See WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 33 (stating that the
ECPA protects stored electronic communications); see also Erica M. Scott,
Protecting Consumer Data While Allowing the Web to Develop Self-Sustaining
Architecture: Is a Trans-Atlantic Browser-Based Opt-In for Behavioral Tracking
the Right Solution?, 26 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 285, 298
(2013) (citing Declan McCullagh, Google, Facebook Go Retro in Push to
Update 1986 Privacy Law, CNET (Oct. 21, 2011, 8:50 AM), http://news.
cnet.com/8301-1009_3-20004071-83.html) (stating that the ECPA, “promulgated
in 1986, before the Internet reached beyond university campuses, is still the
primary piece of legislation that affects data privacy on the Internet”).
206
See WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 49 (noting that, at
the time of the ECPA’s passage, most important documents were kept in hard
copies in the home).
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The ECPA includes the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”),207
which addresses private data collection more closely than any
other federal statute,208 and the Wiretap Act, which litigants have
also attempted to use as a vehicle to challenge private sector data
collection.209 The Wiretap Act provides that “any person whose
wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or
intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action
recover from the person or entity” responsible. 210 However,
litigants have had little success utilizing this statute, in part,
because the statutory language only prohibits interception of the
“contents” of a message, and courts have held that automatically
generated data, such as geolocation information that is perpetually
sent to service providers does not constitute “content” under the
statute.211 This approach appears to be attaining increasing support
among a majority of federal courts.212 This is troubling because, as
previously discussed, such information can be subjected to
207

18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2710.
See Kesan et al., supra note 31, at 399–400 (discussing the three components
of the ECPA—the Wiretap Act, the SCA, and the Pen Register statute); see also
Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 373, 383 (2014) (describing the SCA as “by far the most important” section
of the ECPA).
209
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2712, 3121–3127; see, e.g., In re
Doubleclick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
210
18 U.S.C. § 2520(a); see also In re iPhone App. Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d
1040, 1055, 1061–63 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
211
See In re iPhone App. Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d at 1062 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(5)) (additional citations omitted).
212
See, e.g., In re Google, Inc., Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy Litig.,
988 F. Supp. 2d 434, 443–44 (D. Del. 2013) (citing In re iPhone App. Litig., 844
F. Supp. 2d at 1062) (“[P]ersonally identifiable information that is automatically
generated by the communication” is not “contents” for the purposes of the
Wiretap Act); Sams v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 10-5897, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
53202, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2011) (holding that records identifying
persons using Yahoo ID and email address, IP addresses, and login times were
not content-based); In re § 2703(d) Order, 787 F. Supp. 2d 430, 435-36 (E.D.
Va. 2011) (holding that the Wiretap Act did not cover unique Internet Protocol
(‘IP’) number, Twitter subscriber, user, and screen names, addresses (including
e-mail addresses), telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number
or identity, and temporarily assigned network address”).
208
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algorithmic analyses to draw highly intimate conclusions about
individuals. Other courts have refused to find liability on the part
of third-party data collectors under the Wiretap Act, because the
consumer-plaintiffs consented to the data collection in the first
place through acquiescence to website terms and conditions, and
consent constitutes a statutory exception to liability.213
As to the SCA: without focusing too much herein on what has
become a relatively antiquated statutory distinction between the
providers of electronic communications services (“ECS”) versus
providers of remote computing services (“RCS”), 214 the SCA
addresses both the circumstances in which the government may
compel providers to disclose information about consumers as well
as the circumstances in which the providers may voluntarily
disclose such information to third parties.215 Essentially, the SCA
prohibits providers from voluntarily disclosing the contents of a
communication subject to seven exceptions, one of which is when
the disclosure occurs “with the lawful consent of the originator or
an addressee.”216 The SCA also permits providers to divulge “a
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or
customer of such a service . . . with the lawful consent of the
customer or subscriber.”217 Further, there is also a provision of the
SCA that goes so far as to state that service providers may disclose
user “records” (but not communications’ “contents”) “to any
213

See, e.g., In re Doubleclick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 514
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d).
214
A “remote computing service” is statutorily defined as “the provision to
the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic
communications system.” 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2). An “electronic communication
service” is defined as “any service which provides to users thereof the ability to
send or receive wire or electronic communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15); see
also Kerr, supra note 208, at 395–97 (describing this distinction as “obsolete,”
while also concluding that “ECPA likely offers no protection for access to stored
search queries . . . because it does not fit the 1986 dichotomies codified by the
statute”).
215
18 U.S.C. §§ 2702–2703; see also Kerr, supra note 208, at 384.
216
18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (emphasis added).
217
18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(2); see also Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King,
Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 417 (2014) (discussing the
limited protections available to personal metadata).
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person other than a governmental entity.”218 Given the broad scope
of most online privacy policies, it is not difficult to see why
consumers have had little success in challenging private sector data
collection practices. Moreover, while the SCA also covers the
instances in which service providers shall turn over the content of
users’ communications as well as the records of those
communications to the government,219 one can see little remaining
value in any protections provided to online activities from
governmental intrusion when there are documented instances of
providers such as Google voluntarily scanning users’ email
accounts in search of evidence of criminality and then turning the
evidence over to law enforcement.220
Recent attempts to amend the ECPA to keep pace with
developing technologies have stalled in Congress and, in any
event, have focused more on updating the warrant requirement for
law enforcement access to emails rather than addressing private
sector data collection.221 Notably, in February of 2014, Senators
218

18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6).
As to governmental acquisition of either the “contents” of an electronic
communication, or the “records” of communications, and illustrating the
antiquated nature of the SCA, the SCA prohibits service providers from granting
a governmental entity access to the contents of an electronic communication,
such as an email, without a warrant, unless the message is more than 180 days
old. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a); see also WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note
4, at 60. However, after 180 days, the government may obtain the contents of
any electronic communications pursuant to either a simple administrative
subpoena or a court order to an ECS provider; consumer “records” may be
obtained with as little as an administrative subpoena, or where the subscriber has
consented to the disclosure. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c). Court orders shall issue
upon a showing that there “are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of
a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought,
are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d).
220
See, e.g., Conor Dougherty, Google Gives Child Pornography Email
Evidence to Police, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 4, 2014), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/
2014/08/04/google-gives-child-pornography-email-evidence-to-police/; see also
18 U.S.C. § 2703(e) (providing insulation from liability for providers in cooperating
with law enforcement).
221
See S. 607, 113th Cong., 1st Session, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/query/z?c113:S.607: (known as the “Leahy-Lee ECPA Amendments
219
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John D. Rockefeller and Edward Markey introduced the Data
Broker Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014, which aims
to provide consumers with the right to access to their personal files
held by data brokers, correct inaccuracies therein, and decide for
themselves whether they want to permit their information to be
sold.222 However, this legislation has received little in the way of
press attention or legislative traction since its debut.223 This has
resulted in a situation wherein consumers wishing to prevent the
widespread collection and analysis of their data are essentially
without a remedy.
For instance, in January 2000, a class action lawsuit was filed
against DoubleClick, Inc., a Delaware corporation that was the
largest provider of Internet advertising services in the world at the
Act,” this bill was unanimously reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee
in 2012, but has not advanced, largely due to pressure from the Securities and
Exchange Commission, as well as other governmental agencies, which lacks
warrant authority and wishes to continue to be able to obtain emails by
subpoena); see also Cameron F. Kerry, Microsoft Challenges the Government:
Litigating Extraterritoriality in a Virtual World, BROOKINGS (Jul. 31, 2014, 7:30
AM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/techtank/posts/2014/07/31-microsoft-irelandlawsuit-kerry; Kate Tummarello, Obama’s ‘Big Data’ Report Calls for New
Privacy Laws, THE HILL (May 1, 2014, 2:28 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/
technology/204961-white-house-big-data-report-calls-for-new-privacy-laws; Erin
Mershon, USA Freedom Is Out, Now What?—Buzz: Markey, Hatch to Introduce
Bill on Student Privacy—Rockefeller Ready to Crackdown on Cramming,
POLITICO (Jul. 30, 2014, 10:01 AM), http://www.politico.com/morningtech/
0714/morningtech14827.html; Julian Hattem, Tech’s Bad Year in Washington,
THE HILL (Jan. 3, 2015, 6:11 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/227863techs-bad-year (describing the Email Privacy Act’s failure to even get out of
committee).
222
S. 2025, 113th Cong., 2D Session (2014) (staff working draft), available at
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=13d141a3-76b84191-810b-ebbfd5125759; Press Release, Democratic Press Office, Rockefeller,
Markey, Introduce Data Broker Bill to Ensure Accuracy, Accountability for
Consumers (Feb. 12, 2014), available at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm?p=PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=5b5b0622-1c5b-458491c2-769f9b009778.
223
See, e.g., David Lazarus, Adjusting for Life in the World of Big Data, L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 25, 2014, 1:37 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-lazarus20140826-column.html (stating that the Act “has gone nowhere in the Senate”).
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time.224 The plaintiffs filed suit seeking injunctive and monetary
relief for DoubleClick’s online data collection practices following
DoubleClick’s 1999 acquisition of Abacus Direct Corporation,
which possessed a “database of names, addresses, telephone
numbers, retail purchasing habits and other personal information
on approximately ninety percent of American households, which it
sold to direct marketing companies.”225 The suit essentially sought
to prevent DoubleClick from combining its database of online
profiles with Abacus’ database of offline profiles “in order to
create a super-database capable of matching users’ online activities
with their names and addresses.”226
Emblematic of the lack of legal tools with which the plaintiffs
could prevent these data collection practices, the court held that the
plaintiffs could not succeed under the SCA because they could not
show that Doubleclick’s placement of cookies on users’ computers
and subsequent collection of data was unauthorized.227 The court
likewise found that the plaintiffs had no claim under the Federal
Wiretap Act,228 because the “DoubleClick-affiliated Web sites [were]
‘parties’ to the plaintiffs’ intercepted communications under the
Wiretap Act and . . . they consented to DoubleClick’s interceptions.”229
Further, the plaintiffs’ claims under the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act230 (“CFAA”) failed, as the court held that the plaintiffs

224

In re Doubleclick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Id. at 505. This lawsuit also closely followed an FTC investigation that had
concluded that DoubleClick had violated no U.S. laws. Id. at 506.
226
Id. at 505.
227
Id. at 507, 513–14.
228
See Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511
(“[A]ny person who intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures
any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or
electronic communication . . . shall be punished . . . .”).
229
Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 519. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (“It shall
not be unlawful . . . for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire,
oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the
communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent to such interception . . . .”).
230
18 U.S.C. § 1030.
225

MAR. 2015]

Big Data & the Duty of Competence

587

could not possibly allege the statutory damages threshold with
regard to any particular computer.231
This type of failure has been the rule rather than the exception
in lawsuits filed by consumers attempting to challenge the current
state of online data collection. In Kirch v. Embarq Management
Company,232 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the defendant-Internet service provider
(“ISP”), finding that the ISP did not “intercept” the plaintiffs
communications under the Wiretap Act in part because the ISP’s
funneling of the plaintiffs’ information to an advertiser was carried
out in the “ordinary course of its business,” thus placing the
activity outside of the statutory definition of “interception”—
another exception.233 The district court therein had also found that,
in any event, the plaintiffs would have been unable to recover
because they had consented to the data collection via the Terms of
Service agreement with the ISP.234
In In re iPhone Application Litigation,235 the court, relying in
part on the Doubleclick decision, dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims
under the SCA on four independent grounds, and dismissed the
plaintiffs’ claims under the Wiretap Act, finding that geolocation
and other data being collected did not constitute the “contents” of
communications under the statute.236 The court then dismissed the
plaintiffs’ claims for invasion of privacy stating, “the information
allegedly disclosed to third parties included the unique device
identifier number, personal data, and geolocation information from
Plaintiffs’ iDevices. Even assuming this information was
transmitted without Plaintiffs’ knowledge and consent, a fact
disputed by Defendants, such disclosure [did] not constitute an

231

Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
702 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2012).
233
Id., aff’g Kirch v. Embarq Mgmt. Co., 10-2047-JAR, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 92701, at *26 (D. Kan. Aug. 19, 2011).
234
Kirch, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92701, at *24–29.
235
In re iPhone App. Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
236
Id. at 1056–62.
232
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egregious breach of social norms” and thus did not satisfy the third
prong for invasion of privacy under California law.237
The In re Google, Incorporated, Privacy Policy Litigation 238
plaintiffs sued challenging Google’s 2012 privacy policy changes
wherein Google began combining user information across all of its
services.239 The court began by noting that, while the plaintiffs’ loss of
their personally identifiable information was not sufficient to establish
injury-in-fact for standing purposes, their allegations of economic and
statutory injuries did establish standing.240 Nevertheless, citing Kirch,
the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the Wiretap Act
because Google had transmitted the plaintiffs’ information in the
ordinary course of business.241 Then noting that “[t]he SCA is not a
catchall statute designed to protect the privacy of stored Internet
237

Id. at 1063. Subsequently, the plaintiffs’ class action claims for violations
of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750–1784,
and California’s Unfair Competition Law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§§ 17200-17209, were dismissed for lack of standing because the court found
that the plaintiffs had failed to show causation, although the court stopped short
of stating that Apple’s privacy misrepresentations did not constitute an injury in
fact. See generally In re iPhone Application Litig., No. 11-MD-2250-LHK, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169220, at *1, 74 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2013).
238
In re Google, Inc., Privacy Policy Litig., No. C-12-1382-PSG, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 171124 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013).
239
Id. at *5–6.
240
Id. at *28. Several courts have also been willing to find that standing
existed in instances where plaintiffs sought damages for the collection of
personal data when those claims were made in conjunction with a data breach on
the part of the data-holder. See, e.g., In re Sony Gaming Networks and Customer
Data Security Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 962 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (finding
standing where the plaintiffs had “plausibly alleged a ‘credible threat’ of
impending harm based on the disclosure of their Personal Information following
the intrusion”).
241
Id. at *30–37. But see In re Google, Inc., Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-2430LHK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172784, at *1, 58 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013)
(presenting a case in which plaintiffs’ state and federal wiretapping claims
against Google, based on Google’s practice of scanning emails and using
customer data to create user profiles and using that data in a manner unrelated to
its providing of its services, survived a motion to dismiss in part because the
ordinary course of business exception to the Wiretap Act did not apply when
Google violated its own privacy policy).
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communications,” 242 the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims
under the SCA because: (1) Sec. 2701(c) of the SCA exempts
“conduct authorized by the person or entity providing a wire or
electronic communications service” from criminal punishment; and
(2) the plaintiffs had equivocated in their allegations under Sec.
2702 regarding whether or not Google had actually disclosed the
plaintiffs’ information to third parties, thus failing to state a
claim. 243 The court then dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim for
misappropriation of likeness and intrusion upon seclusion based on
the users’ consent, and similarly dismissed the plaintiffs’ breach of
contract claims.244
The case law indicates that users wishing to either enjoin
private sector data collection practices or recover monetary damages
resulting from those practices have been largely unsuccessful. Tort
and contract claims quickly encounter insurmountable consent
issues insofar as pleading a cognizable claim is concerned. Claims
under the ECPA routinely fail both because of the aforementioned
consent issue, and because the ECPA is riddled with exceptions.245
Lacking comprehensive congressional action, or the emergence of
radically creative judicial applications of the ECPA, consumers are
left without a remedy. However, though certainly not a systemic
solution, the FTC’s recent efforts at curbing unfair and deceptive
practices in this regard are nevertheless noteworthy.
C. Federal Trade Commission Involvement
The FTC recently called upon Congress to “enact[] legislation
that would enable consumers to learn of the existence and activities
of data brokers and provide consumers with reasonable access to
242

In re Google, Inc., Privacy Policy Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171124, at
*38 (quoting Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act,
and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1214
(2004)).
243
Id. at *37–39.
244
Id. at *39–44, 49–51. See also In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098,
1109 (9th Cir. 2014) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claims under both the SCA and
the Wiretap Act).
245
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c).
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information about them held by these entities.”246 It also recommended
providing consumers with the ability to “opt out” of having their
information shared.247 Of particular note, given the previous discussion
regarding predictive analytics as applied to the individual, the FTC
report also stated:
[T]o further enhance transparency, the Commission recommends that
Congress consider legislation requiring data brokers to clearly disclose
to consumers (e.g., on their website) that they not only use the raw data
that they obtain from their sources, such as a person’s name, address,
age, and income range, but that they also derive certain inferences from
the data.248

Despite the absence of effective legislation, FTC enforcement
has achieved some degree of success in its efforts to improve
transparency and limit some of the more egregious collection
practices used by data brokers.249 In 2009, for example, the FTC
settled a complaint lodged against Sears Holdings Management
Corporation that charged that Sears failed to disclose the scope of
its tracking and collection of consumers’ personal information.250
This stemmed from Sears’s invitation to consumers to become
members of the “My SHC Community” in which consumers were
enticed to participate by Sears’ offer of ten dollars to each
participant.251 While participation in the “My SHC Community”
program asked consumers to download “research” software that
was billed as confidentially tracking online browsing, the FTC
alleged that consumers were not informed that the software would
also collect information from consumers’ online shopping carts,
online bank statements, drug prescription records, email histories,
246

FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at vii.
Id. at viii; see generally CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 156 (describing
“opting out” as one of three generally recognized privacy strategies, alongside
notice and consent, and anonymization).
248
FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at 52 (emphasis added).
249
See Federal Trade Comm’n Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a),(n).
250
See Press Release, FTC, Sears Settles FTC Charges Regarding Tracking
Software (Jun. 4, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2009/06/sears-settles-ftc-charges-regarding-tracking-software) [hereinafter
Sears Press Release].
251
Id.
247
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and the like.252 The final settlement required Sears to make specific
disclosures to consumers as to precisely what data was being
collected and the purpose for which it would be used. It also
required Sears to delete all data that was collected during the
program.253
In 2011, Facebook settled claims brought by the FTC on
charges that Facebook’s privacy practices were “unfair and
deceptive.”254 Among the listed violations of Facebook’s privacy
promises to customers set forth in the FTC complaint were
allegations that Facebook: (1) had promised users it would not
share personal information with advertisers, although it did; (2)
had a “Verified Apps” program in which it represented that
Facebook had certified the security of participating apps when it
had not; and (3) “claimed that when users deactivated or deleted
their accounts, their photos and videos would be inaccessible. But
Facebook allowed access to the content, even after users had
deactivated or deleted their accounts.”255
Similarly, in 2012, Google settled with the FTC, agreeing to
pay a record $22.5 million penalty to settle charges that it
“misrepresented to users of Apple Inc.’s Safari Internet browser
that it would not place tracking ‘cookies’ or serve targeted ads to
those users, violating [the] earlier privacy settlement between the
company and the FTC.”256 Likewise, in May of 2014, the FTC
reached a settlement agreement with Snapchat, a popular app that
252

Id.
Id.; see also G.S. Hans, Privacy Policies, Terms of Service, and FTC
Enforcement: Broadening Unfairness Regulation for a New Era, 19 MICH.
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 163, 173–75 (2012) (discussing the FTC enforcement
action against Sears).
254
Press Release, FTC, Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived
Consumers by Failing to Keep Privacy Promises (Nov. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/11/facebook-settles-ftccharges-it-deceived-consumers-failing-keep.
255
Id.
256
Press Release, FTC, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC Charges
It Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet
Browser (Aug. 9, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-million-settle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented.
253
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“billed itself as a way of sending messages—snaps—which would
self-destruct within a set timeframe after being viewed by the
recipient, over violations of Snapchat’s promises regarding the
“ ‘ephemeral’ nature of ‘snaps.’ ”257 Snapchat’s violations received
additional attention in November 2014, when a massive hack
dubbed the “Snappening” resulted in the release of “a database
containing over 100,000 images and videos sent across Snapchat
leaked online for the titillation of the masses.”258
In addition to the successes of the FTC in combating alleged
deceptive and unfair practices within the big data industry, the
FTC has been among the most vocal advocates for comprehensive
Congressional action to increase transparency within the data
broker industry. 259 Despite these successes, the overwhelming
consensus is that current privacy laws are woefully inadequate to
deal with the phenomenon that massive data collection—let alone
the practice of predictive analytics—represents.
D. Executive Involvement and the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights
For its part, the White House appears to support the efforts of
the FTC, at least publicly. In 2012, the Obama administration
released a report that set forth the so-called Consumer Privacy Bill
of Rights (“CPBR”). 260 Based largely on the Fair Information

257

See Press Release, Snapchat Settles FTC Charges That Promises of
Disappearing Messages Were False, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 8, 2014),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/snapchatsettles-ftc-charges-promises-disappearing-messages-were; see also Charlie Osborne,
FTC Finalizes Charges Against Snapchat Over User Privacy, ZDNET (Jan. 2,
2015), http://www.zdnet.com/article/ftc-finalizes-charges-against-snapchat-overuser-privacy/.
258
Charlie Osborne, supra note 257.
259
See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at vii.
260
See generally EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CONSUMER DATA
PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY
AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY (Feb. 2012),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf
[hereinafter CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY REPORT].
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Practice Principles,261 this proposed legislative initiative focuses on
several key areas, such as increased individual control for
consumers in terms of what personal data is collected from them
by private companies, and increased transparency so that
customers are provided with easily understandable information
regarding privacy and security policies.262 The CPBR also seeks to
establish a consumer right to ensure that companies handle their
data in a secure manner, while also addressing several other areas,
including an increased focus on providing consumers with the
ability to access and correct personal data “in a manner that is
appropriate to the sensitivity of the data and the risk of adverse
consequences to consumers if the data is inaccurate.”263
Although at the time of its release the report stated that
“[s]trengthening consumer data privacy protections in the United
States is an important Administration priority[,]”264 and the subsequent
2014 White House Report on Big Data similarly recommended
amending the ECPA,265 as of this writing there has been little in the
way of serious legislative attempts at implementation. However,
while it is noteworthy that the U.S. Department of Commerce’s
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
recently requested public “comment on ‘big data’ developments
and how they impact the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights,” it was
unclear at the conclusion of the public comment period what, if any,
efforts at implementation would likely follow.266 Unsurprisingly,
261

Commonly known as the “FIPPs,” the Fair Information Practice Principles
emerged from recommendations made by the U.S. Department of Health,
Education and Welfare in its 1973 report entitled Records, Computers, and the
Rights of Citizens. See WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 17.
262
CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 260, at 1.
263
Id. It is noteworthy, and somewhat ironic, that one of the key goals of what
is intended to be a privacy-enhancing proposal—empowering consumers to
correct false information held by data brokers—requires consumers to give data
brokers more information about themselves.
264
Id. at 5.
265
WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 60.
266
Big Data and Consumer Privacy in the Internet Economy, 79 Fed. Reg.
32714 (June 6, 2014), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/
big_data_rfc.pdf; see also Alexei Alexis, NTIA Leads Privacy Bill of Rights
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the data broker industry opposes the implementation of the
CPBR.267
In the meantime, the data broker industry has largely been
subject to self-regulation.268 In the absence of effective legislation
governing Internet privacy policies, the recent White House Report
on Big Data described the “self-regulatory” nature of the current
regime, stating that “companies agree to a set of principles when
engaged in ‘behavioral’ or multisite advertising where they collect
information about user activities over time and across different
websites in order to infer user preferences.” 269 However,
self-regulation is problematic as the primary protection offered to
consumers. The industry has already racked up a less-than-laudable
track record of deceptive privacy policies, violations of existing
privacy policies, and settlements with the FTC for unfair or
deceptive business practices. Additionally, the Do Not Track
initiative has largely failed because of websites’ unwillingness to
honor consumer requests. The prudent consumer, or attorney, is
one who assumes that self-regulation is ultimately a failing
proposition.
The same White House Report also notes the “privacy fatigue”
that is commonly experienced as a symptom of having to wade
through a seemingly endless barrage of legalese to use a given
service.270 As much of the data collection industry’s power stems
Review in Light of ‘Big Data’ Trend, BNA (June 4, 2014), http://www.
bna.com/ntia-leads-privacy-n17179891045/.
267
See, e.g., Jennifer Glasgow, Does the US Need the Privacy Bill of Rights
Enacted Into Law?, ACXIOM (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.acxiom.com/us-needprivacy-bill-rights-enacted-law/.
268
See, e.g., Perry Simpson, White House Supports Self-Regulation in
Data-Driven Marketing, DIRECT MARKETING NEWS (May 2, 2014), http://www.
dmnews.com/white-house-supports-self-regulation-in-data-driven-marketing/article/
345388/; see also Glasgow, supra note 267.
269
WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 41.
270
Id. at 42 (citing Sarah Kidner, Privacy Fatigue Hits Facebook: Have You
Updated Your Settings?, WHICH? CONVERSATION, (Oct. 18, 2011), http://
conversation.which.co.uk/technology/facebook-privacy-settings-privacy-fatigue/;
Aleecia McDonald & Lorrie Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4
INFORMATION SOCIETY: A JOURNAL OF LAW & POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION
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from the consent garnered from consumers as a result of their
unwillingness to read, or inability to comprehend, such policies,
this is further reason for skepticism as to the long-term success of a
system of self-regulation. To be fair, however, this result—
generalized malaise, rather than mass public outrage—is likely at
least partially related to shifting societal norms regarding what is
or is not “creepy” in terms of privacy and data collection and
dissemination in the digital age.271
E. Additional Considerations: A Symptom of the Disease—
Permanent Retention and Creative Discovery Practices
A byproduct of the universal realization of the enduring value
of data is the widespread and prolonged retention of that data,
which in some cases may represent a veritable treasure trove of
information, discoverable or otherwise, that may never be
deleted. 272 As companies like Google, Facebook, and countless
others have developed policies wherein they save practically
everything that users do online,273 it should be noted that this trend
SOCIETY, 545, 545, 564 (2008)); see also Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The
No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 546
(2014) (describing the ubiquitous phenomenon of customers’ routine failure to
read form contracts offered by providers of goods and services, leading to
problems of consumer consent and a lack of competitive pressure on business to
improve the contractual terms offered to customers).
271
See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology,
Privacy and Shifting Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59, 72–73 (2014)
(describing changing privacy norms and stating that the advent of caller ID in
the 1980s was widely regarded as “creepy” and resulted in some attempts at
regulation at the state level as critics considered it a privacy violation to see who
was calling in to, for instance, an HIV help line, or a drug or alcohol clinic. This
concern, however yielded in the face of changing norms, and “[t]oday, many
users would not answer the phone if the number were not listed. What was
initially considered a privacy violation is now considered a privacy-enhancing
technology.”).
272
See FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at 22.
273
See also CUKIER BIG DATA, supra note 4, at 174 (advocating for limited
time frames for data retention and reuse, stating that such an approach would
“banish[] the specter of ‘permanent memory’—the risk that one can never
escape one’s past because the digital records can always be dredged up”); see,
e.g., Privacy & Terms, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/
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has not gone unnoticed in either criminal or civil litigation.
Individual users’ search queries have already been the subject of
governmental, private, and international discovery.274 “Government
agencies, courts and parties in civil litigation regularly ask
technology and communications companies for information about
how a person has used the companies’ services.”275 Google’s most
recent transparency report notes that government requests for user
information has increased 120% since Google first began
publishing such numbers in 2009.276
Equally troubling is the persuasive suggestion by some
scholars that the current legal landscape makes it unclear the extent
to which the SCA prevents a party in civil litigation from obtaining
communications maintained by cloud services providers as part of
civil discovery. Even communications deleted by users may be
recoverable. The SCA may allow discovery of such communications
despite the fact that the SCA does not on its face authorize service
providers to make such disclosures for the purposes of civil
discovery. 277 In Flagg v. City of Detroit, 278 the defendant-City
argued that the SCA precluded the production in civil litigation of
electronic communications that had been previously deleted by the
users but had nevertheless been stored by a non-party service

privacy/?fg=1 (last modified Dec. 19, 2014) (describing what is collected, and
also stating that “after you delete information from our services, we may not
immediately delete residual copies from our active servers and may not remove
information from our backup systems”).
274
See Ron A. Dolin, Search Query Privacy: The Problem of Anonymization,
2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 137, 137 (2010); see also ACLU v. Gonzales, 478
F. Supp. 2d 775 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674
(N.D. Cal. 2006); see generally Foley, supra note 112, at 451–54 (discussing the
use of subpoenas to acquire records of one’s Internet activities in criminal
litigation).
275
Google Transparency Report—Requests for User Information: Legal Process,
GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/legalprocess/
(last visited June 26, 2014).
276
Access to Information, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/
(last visited June 26, 2014).
277
See Kesan et al., supra note 31, at 415.
278
252 F.R.D. 346 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
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provider.279 After a thorough analysis of the applicable provisions
of the SCA, the court concluded that the information held by the
third party could be produced via a Rule 34 280 request for
production directed to the defendant-City itself, rather than the
third party.281 The court reasoned that the defendant maintained
“control” over that information because the issuance of its consent
to the third party would allow the third party to disclose the
“deleted” communications under the SCA.282 Similarly, in Thayer
v. Chiczewski,283 the court first acknowledged “most courts have
concluded that third parties cannot be compelled to disclose
electronic communications pursuant to a civil—as opposed to
criminal—discovery subpoena . . . .” Nevertheless, the court,
applying reasoning similar to that found in Flagg, ordered
third-party America Online (“AOL”) to turn over its records of the
plaintiff’s previously deleted emails, because the subpoena in
question sought “documents that [the plaintiff] would be required
to produce if he had not deleted them from his email accounts.”284
279

Id. at 347.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) which states:
A party may serve on any other party a request within the scope of
Rule 26(b):
(1) to produce and permit the requesting party or its representative
to inspect, copy, test, or sample the following items in the
responding party’s possession, custody, or control:
(A) any designated documents or electronically stored information
. . . stored in any medium . . . .

280

Id.

281

See Flagg, 252 F.R.D. at 353.
See id. at 352–53 (citations omitted) (stating that Rule 34 requests for
production “may properly extend to items that are in that party’s ‘control.’”
Then, after finding that electronic information may be said to be within a party’s
control when it is “maintained by a third party of [a] company’s behalf[,]” the
court found that such information may be obtained in discovery in civil
litigation). But see Bower v. Mirvat El-Nady Bower, 808 F. Supp. 2d 348, 349
(D. Mass. 2011) (denying the plaintiff’s attempts to produce the defendant’s
emails, lacking the defendant’s consent, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
283
No. 07-C-1290, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84176 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2009).
284
Id. at *15; see also Negro v. Superior Court, 230 Cal. App. 4th 879, 883
(Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that the lower court’s imputation of consent on the
282
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These cases stand for the proposition that, even if the SCA
prevents entities like Facebook, Google, or Yahoo! from opening
up their data vaults in response to Rule 45 subpoenas without a
user’s consent, courts are increasingly willing to order litigants to
request copies of electronic records and communications from
providers themselves pursuant to Rule 34. This practice sidesteps
the consent requirement and, for all intents and purposes, the few
remaining privacy protections of the SCA altogether. This is
significant because, if courts interpret electronic information stored
in the cloud—search query histories, websites visited, emails
previously deleted by users, etc.—as perpetually within the
custody or control of the consumer due to the consumer’s ability to
consent to disclosure by third parties, and third parties retain user
information forever, then courts can simply order litigants to
request this information from service providers pursuant to a
Rule 34 subpoena.285 Such an interpretation potentially places an
individual’s entire Internet history into play in future civil
litigation, which may contain discoverable information itself, be
used to lead to discoverable information, or be used as fuel for
predictive analytical machinery.

part of the petitioner was improper, but nevertheless finding that consent existed
where petitioner had been ordered by a Florida court to give his express consent
to a third-party service provider—in this case Google—and he had done so,
thus, the SCA did not protect petitioner’s emails); Jake Vandelist, Status
Update: Adapting the Stored Communications Act to a Modern World, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 1536, 1547–48 (2014) (collecting cases, and discussing the use of
discovery requests served on users rather than providers as an end-run around
the SCA).
285
See FTC v. Sterling Precious Metals, L.L.C., No. 12-80597-CIV, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50976 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2013); see also Doe v. City of San
Diego, No. 12-cv-689-MMA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74802, at *12–13 (S.D.
Cal. May 28, 2013) (finding that, while the SCA prohibited Verizon from
disclosing customer records to a subpoena issued by the City of San Diego, “the
City [was] permitted to seek Plaintiff’s cell phone records by serving a request
for production of documents pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34”).
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V. AN ATTORNEY’S DUTY OF COMPETENCE—NEW ETHICAL
OBLIGATIONS ARISE IN THE WAKE OF RAPID TECHNOLOGICAL
DEVELOPMENTS
Just as Intelius’s predictive models could accurately predict
individual criminality, 286 so too can data brokers use similar
processes to make other predictions and deductions about
individuals that possess practical utility in conducting opposition
research for litigants. Data brokers already sell “people search”
products containing personal information to whomever wishes to
purchase them, which one could reasonably argue demonstrates a
certain industry-wide comfort with selling sensitive personal
information at retail. Add to this state of affairs the aforementioned
mass storage of online activities due to increases in both storage
capacity and the value of data, and a conclusion begins to emerge
that technological advances are leading to the rise of an affirmative
ethical and professional duty for attorneys to instruct and educate
their clients on responsible, preferably anonymous, use of the
Internet.
It seems the only thing standing in the way of the widespread
commercial availability of publicly accessible profiles detailing
everything from a litigant’s proclivity for criminality or existing
mood or mental disorders to the health of his or her spouse or the
financial circumstances in a given household is the will to create it.
There is no reason why algorithms could not be tasked with
processing existing data to assess whether someone is rich or poor,
faithful or lecherous, healthy or sick, trustworthy or false,
politically active or apathetic, sober or otherwise, or engaged in
any manner of malfeasance or criminality.287 The problem with
relying on a self-regulatory regime is that, under such a regime, the
only true check on data brokers’ activities is public outrage.
286

See supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Jennifer Golbeck, Smart People Prefer Curly Fries, SLATE (Oct.
7, 2014, 7:48 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/
10/youarewhatyoulike_find_out_what_algorithms_can_tell_about_you_based_on_
your.html (discussing the use of algorithmic analyses to make intimate and
personal deductions from innocuous bits of social media data); see also
Robertson, supra note 159; Kosinski, supra note 165.
287
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However, if the past two decades have been any indication, the
public’s capacity for outrage and indignation at digital privacy
intrusions may be waning.288 If the public’s comfort with intrusive
private sector surveillance is increasing, while the principal check
on data broker activities is public sentiment, it is reasonable to
conclude that the likelihood of “people search” products becoming
progressively more detailed and invasive in the years ahead
represents an unacceptably high risk to litigants. When one
considers that information, once disseminated, remains in the
digital world forever, it will be too late to avoid falling victim to
such investigative tactics in the future unless individuals stop the
information seepage today.
The Internet’s relatively recent assumption of its role as a tool
central to the practice of law has brought with it increasingly
complex ethical questions for attorneys as they attempt to navigate
new and uncertain issues in the digital marketplace.289 For instance,
Google’s practice of digitally scanning the contents of its users’
emails in order to deliver more accurately targeted ads initially led
to difficult questions in terms of third-party disclosures and the
possible waiver of attorney-client confidentiality.290 Further, some
288

See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Motorcycle Information Network,
Inc., No. 5:04-cv-12-oc-10GRJ, 2008 WL 906739, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 2,
2008) (noting that, “[i]ndeed, the failure to use computerized legal research may
be a basis for a claim of malpractice in some instances.”).
290
See, e.g., Shellie Stephens, Going Google: Your Practice, The Cloud, and
the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 237, 239
(2011) (describing cloud computing’s impact on an attorney’s obligations under
Rule 1.6); see also N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n, Op. 820 (2008), available at
http://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=5222; Google Terms
of Service, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (last visited
June 16, 2014) (“Our automated systems analyze your content (including
emails) to provide you personally relevant product features, such as customized
search results, tailored advertising, and spam and malware detection. This
analysis occurs as the content is sent, received, and when it is stored.”); see
generally Timothy Peterson, Cloudy With a Chance of Waiver: How Cloud
Computing Complicates the Attorney-Client Privilege, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
383 (2012) (discussing waiver of privilege through use of cloud-based computer
services).
289
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scholars have persuasively argued that the phenomenon of the
online tracking of attorneys as they conduct online legal research
could be said to “produce a limited or general disclosure that
constitutes a waiver of both attorney-client and work product and
violates the attorney’s ethical commitment to confidentiality.”291
Generally, the prudent attorney should advise against a client’s
needless dissemination of vast amounts personal information that
could potentially be used by another to the client’s detriment.
Advocating for individuals to protect personal information because
it could at some point in the future be used against them is not in
and of itself a novel suggestion nor is it a novel interpretation of
the attorneys’ duty of competence to suggest that this duty places
an obligation upon lawyers to advise their clients regarding the
potential pitfalls of recklessly circulating intimate details of their
personal lives in the digital realm.292 For instance, a recent New
York County Lawyer’s Association ethics opinion’s topic
addressed “[w]hat advice is appropriate to give a client with
respect to existing or proposed postings on social media sites.”293
Noting that personal injury defendants, rather than hiring private
investigators, have with increasing frequency turned to YouTube,
Facebook, and other social media websites in order to research the
activities of their opponents in litigation, the opinion stated that an
attorney’s obligation to competently represent clients under Rule
1.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct could give rise to an
obligation to advise clients in terms of how their position might be
adversely affected by their use of social media.294 Most of the bar
associations that have addressed this issue thus far concur.295 Thus,
291

Klinefelter, supra note 25, at 22.
See, e.g., NYCLA Opinion, supra note 2; NYSBA Opinion, supra note 2;
PBA Opinion, supra note 2; Penn. Opinion, supra note 2; NCB Opinion, supra
note 2.
293
NYCLA Opinion, supra note 2, at 1.
294
Id. at 3. This consideration is of course tempered by legal duties to refrain
from suppressing or concealing evidence, as well as issues of spoliation, under
applicable law.
295
See, e.g., NYSBA Opinion, supra note 2; see also PBA Opinion, supra
note 2 (concurring with the conclusions of the New York State Bar Association
in stating that attorneys may advise clients regarding the removal of potentially
292
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an attorney’s obligation to prevent a client from needlessly
exposing personal details of his life to the world, which could
potentially be used against him by his adversaries in the course of
litigation, is not new. It is an obligation that stems directly from the
attorney’s duty of competence. For attorneys, however, it is a
constantly evolving obligation and fast moving technological
advancements significantly complicate the attorney’s task.
Few, if any, standards of attorney competence currently exist,
however, with regard to advising clients as to how to safely browse
the Internet, as well as how to generally conduct personal matters
and business affairs online in the era of big data, and in an
environment in which every click and keystroke is recorded,
personal Internet activity data is being commoditized and sold, and
the science of predictive analytics is developing with increasing
rapidity.296 Given the rate at which personal information is being
damaging information from social media subject to the obligations to preserve
evidence).
296
See WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 37 (“Controversially,
predictive analytics can now be applied to analyze a person’s individual
propensity to criminal activity,” and describing how police forces in the United
States are “shift[ing] the focus of predictive policing from geographical factors
to identity”); Mandi Woodruff, The Secret Way Companies Are Using Big Data
to Score You, YAHOO FINANCE (Apr. 2, 2014, 10:13 AM), https://finance.yahoo.com/
news/the-secret-way-companies-are-using-big-data-to-score-you-135018683.html
(describing the commoditization of personal information culled by an individual’s
internet activity to create credit “scores” not subject to the FCRA); Brad
Howarth, Big Data: How Predictive Analytics is Taking Over the Public Sector,
THE GUARDIAN (Jun. 13, 2014, 7:55 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2014/jun/13/big-data-how-predictive-analytics-is-taking-over-the-public-sector
(describing the Australian government’s use of big data analytics to, among
other things, predict emergency room admissions on a given day with 93%
accuracy; and identify tax havens and businesses failing to meet compliance
obligations); Rebecca Merrett, NSW Police Force Sees Opportunities in
Predictive Analytics, CIO (May, 30, 2014, 1:20 PM), https://www.cio.com.au/
article/546402/nsw_police_force_sees_opportunities_predictive_analytics/ (describing
the implementation of predictive analytic models by law enforcement to deploy
resources proactively); Ger Daly, Embracing the Police Force of the Future, CNN
(Sept. 19, 2013, 10:55 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/18/tech/innovation/
police-future-technology/index.html?iref=allsearch (describing the use of data
mining and predictive analytics to “predict patterns of future criminal
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collected, analyzed, and sold as well as the potential value of such
personal information in the context of civil litigation, attorneys
may be falling short of their ethical obligations if they do not at the
very least avail clients of current best practices and options
available to them insofar as anonymous Internet browsing and
safeguarding their personal data is concerned. The most recent
addition to Rule 1.1 is a step in that direction.
Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct addresses
attorney competency.297 The rule states “[a] lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.”298 The difficulty for
attorneys is that what constitutes “preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation” of a given client is quickly
changing in the wake of swift technological advancements.
Comment 8 to Rule 1.1 has recently been added to provide that:
[In order t]o maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer
should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the
benefits and risks associated with relevant technology, engage in
continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal
education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.299

With this obligation in mind, as well as the foregoing discussion
regarding the ubiquity of privatized data collection and the
developing field of predictive analytics, the question is this: Does
an attorney have an ethical obligation insofar as advising clients
regarding their day-to-day Internet usage? If an obligation exists to
behavior”); Edith Ramirez, The Secret Eyes Watching You Shop, CNN (May 30,
2014, 10:35 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/30/opinion/ramirez-data-brokers-ftc/
index.html?iref=allsearch (describing collection and analysis by data brokers,
and stating that “[d]ata brokers scoop up the digital breadcrumbs we leave as we
shop in stores and online, and apply ‘big data’ analytical tools to predict where
we’re going, what we’ll buy, and what we’ll do next—sometimes even before
we know ourselves what we’ll buy next.”).
297
See generally ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1.
298
Id.
299
Id. at R. 1.1 cmt. 8 (emphasis added); see also id. at R 1.0(h) (“‘Reasonable’
or ‘reasonably’ when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer denotes the conduct
of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.”).
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discuss with clients what Facebook posts a client should think
twice about, and an attorney perceives a likelihood (or even a
chance) that the totality of a client’s accrued daily Internet activity
over time could ultimately be used to yield far more information
than any single post to social media, should an obligation not also
exist to advise the client in terms of how to prevent irresponsible
web browsing?
Bar associations are rushing to keep pace with evolving ethical
obligations in the face of rapid technological advances, and the
tendency is to advise attorneys to err on the side of caution. For
instance, in 2011, grounding its analysis in rules 1.6(a)300 and 1.1301
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the ABA released an
ethics opinion that concluded that unencrypted email communications
between attorney and client were likely permissible under Rule 1.6
because there was “a reasonable expectation of privacy from a
technological and legal standpoint.” 302 Nevertheless, since the
current legal protections afforded to, for instance, emails sent from
an employee’s workplace computer are in flux and many such
emails have been held to be admissible in court proceedings
despite attorney-client privilege, “a lawyer typically should instruct
the employee-client to avoid using a workplace device or system
for sensitive or substantive communications, and perhaps for any
attorney-client communications[.]”303 This is “because even seemingly
ministerial communications involving matters such as scheduling
can have substantive ramifications.”304
A parallel may be drawn herein: As is the case with regards to
the uncertain and fluctuating legal protections pertaining to
workplace emails, attorneys are now similarly faced with an
unregulated data collection industry to which the applicable laws,
300

See id. at R. 1.6(a) (stating that a lawyer must safeguard “information
relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent”).
301
See id. at R. 1.1.
302
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-459 (2011)
(citing ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413
(1999)).
303
ABA Formal Op. 11-459.
304
Id.

MAR. 2015]

Big Data & the Duty of Competence

605

to the extent there are any, are uncertain and in tremendous flux.
The 2011 opinion errs on the side of caution, advising clients to
avoid using workplace email accounts because the risk of
information contained in such accounts being used to the
advantage of an adversary is unacceptably high. The same logic
applies with equal force to the personal data that most consumers
freely surrender into the digital sphere each day.
Attorneys are hardly failing to recognize the potential value of
information that can be accessed through online investigation and
analysis, including the utilization of major data brokers.
Practitioners have published articles offering advice and insight as
to the effective use of search engines, social networking sites—in
both civil and criminal proceedings—blogs, online court records,
and personal data brokers, such as Intelius, as part of a
comprehensive informal discovery strategy.305 Bar associations have
begun offering CLE programs with titles such as “Cybersleuth’s
Guide to the Internet,” in which one of the covered topics was “the
advantages (and limitations) of [using] fee-based data broker
databases to create dossiers about your subject.”306 It has also been
suggested that there is an affirmative obligation for attorneys to
inquire into social networking information that may hold potential
relevance in a given matter. 307 Already on the cutting edge of
providing advanced data-mining technologies to litigators, LexisNexis
offers products that promise to aid litigants to “get to the right

305

See generally Todd B. Baker, The Internet and the Law: Informal
Discovery on the Internet, 52 THE ADVOCATE 23 (2010); see also Steven C.
Bennett, Symposium: Ethical Limitations on Informal Discovery of Social Media
Information, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 473, 500-02 (2013); Craig Ball,
Cybersleuthing for People Who Still Can’t Program Their VCRs, 20 GPSOLO
40, 45 (2003) (“Literally hundreds of data brokers sell their services online,
ranging from law-abiding corporate behemoths like Choice-Point and Experian
to fly-by-night outfits on both sides of the law.”).
306
See Continuing Legal Education: Cybersleuth’s Guide to the Internet,
KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, https://www.kcba.org/cle/pdf/212-Brochure.pdf (last
visited Jan. 31, 2015).
307
Steven C. Bennett, Ethical Limitations on Informal Discovery of Social
Media Information, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 473, 478 (2013).
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decisions sooner with in-depth judge profiles,”308 “sharpen ongoing
case strategy and manage client expectations informed by the
comprehensive collection of data on experts, judges and attorneys[,]”309
and “[u]tilize the largest, most comprehensive collection of jury
verdicts and settlements available online . . . to evaluate risk and
opportunity, gain insight into potential outcomes and determine an
initial course of action.”310 In short, the tools of computer-assisted
data mining and analysis are already being put to work in the legal
world, as are people search products and other data broker services.
The ABA, for its part, thus far seems to generally sanction the
practice of delving into one’s digital footprint in the course of
litigation. A recently released ethics opinion addressed the ethical
issues that arise when attempting to investigate a juror’s, or
potential juror’s “internet presence.”311 The opinion concludes that,
subject to an attorney’s obligations under Rule 3.5(b),312 and Rule
8.4(a),313 it is permissible to “passively” use websites and social
media to access publicly available information on jurors, if no
direct communication between the attorney and the juror takes
place.314 Thus, the general trend, from an ethical standpoint, seems
to be one where research on both jurors and litigants in the digital
sphere is expected, accepted, and, sometimes, obligatory.

308

The LexisNexis Litigation Research Portfolio, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.
lexisnexis.com/en-us/legal-solutions/litigation-portfolio.page (last visited Aug.
4, 2014).
309
LexisNexis Litigation Profile Suite, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/
en-us/products/lexisnexis-profile-suite.page (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
310
LexisNexis Verdict & Settlement Analyzer, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.
com/en-us/products/verdict-and-settlement-analyzer.page (last visited Aug. 4, 2014).
311
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 14-466 (2014).
312
See MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 3.5(b) (“A lawyer shall not . . .
communicate ex parte with [a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official]
unless authorized to do so by law or court order.”).
313
MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (“It is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of
another.”).
314
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 14-466 (2014).
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Even if, lacking systemic protections for personal data, one
were to simply trust that the intentions and motives of each and
every member of the data broker industry are ethical and
benevolent in nature, it must be remembered that these companies
are still vulnerable to hacking and other scams just like everyone
else. 315 For instance, in October 2013, the Justice Department
brought criminal charges against a Vietnamese man who took part
in the purchase of over 500,000 consumer records from data broker
Experian, which he then sold to third parties for the purposes of
identity theft.316 This incident was reminiscent of a similar occurrence
at ChoicePoint in 2005, wherein ChoicePoint discovered that it had
been routinely selling personal data dossiers to criminal enterprises
posing as legitimate businesses. This incident ultimately resulted in
an FTC settlement wherein ChoicePoint was fined $10 million in
315

See, e.g., Mike Isaac, Data Breaches in New York Hit Record High in
2013, State Attorney General Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2014, 12:01 AM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/15/attorney-general-says-new-york-hadmore-than-900-data-breaches-in-2013/; Alastair Jamieson & Erin McClaim,
Millions of Target Customers’ Credit, Debit Card Accounts May Be Hit by Data
Breach, NBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/
millions-target-customers-credit-debit-card-accounts-may-be-hit-f2D11775203
(describing massive data breaches at Target; the 2007 data breach of more than
45 million customers from T.J. Maxx, Marshalls, and others; the 2011 hack on
over 100 million Sony Playstation user accounts); Charles Riley, Data Breach in
UPS Stores in 24 States, CNN (Aug. 21, 2014, 9:39 PM), http://money.cnn.com/
2014/08/21/technology/security/ups-store-data-hack/index.html (citing a CNN
Money analysis which found that fifty percent of Americans were the victims of
data breaches in a recent twelve month period); Alexis Tsotsis, Employee Data
Breach the Worst Part of Sony Hack, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 16, 2014),
http://techcrunch.com/2014/12/16/hack-sony-twice-shame-on-sony/.
316
See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Off. of Public Affairs, Vietnamese
National Charged in Widespread International Scheme to Steal and Sell
Hundreds of Thousands of U.S. Persons’ Personally Identifiable Information
(Oct. 18, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/October/13crm-1116.html; see also Gil Aegerter, Credit Giant Experian Tangled in ID
Theft Case, CNBC NEWS (Oct, 24, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101143539#.;
Letter from Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV, Chairman of Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transp., to Don Robert, CEO of Experian (Oct. 23,
2013), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/MSNBC/Sections/NEWS/
A_U.S.%20news/US-news-PDFs/experian-commerce-letter.pdf.
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civil penalties and $5 million in consumer redress.317 Given the
ubiquity of high profile hacks and data breaches, not to mention
old-fashioned scams and fraud, the inevitable conclusion is that
personal data amassed by third-party brokers is never truly safe,
either from the legal or illegal sale of that data.
If it is permissible and advisable to consult with clients
regarding their use of social media due to the potential for such
uses to adversely affect a client’s position in litigation, it must
follow that it is equally permissible and advisable to consult with
clients regarding their daily Internet activities due to the potential
for such activities to adversely affect a client’s position in
litigation. Consider the following: there is currently a lack of
ethical prohibitions on attorneys in terms of conducting research
on litigants, witnesses, and jurors. Personal information has
become highly profitable in the context of civil litigation, and the
data market is essentially unregulated, largely unpredictable, and
once a keystroke is struck it is stored forever.318 Attorneys should
view these trends in concert with developments in predictive
analytic techniques and technologies and the deductions that are
now possible as a result. In so doing, attorneys must recognize that
an ethical obligation is arising to both instruct clients as to the
ramifications of irresponsible Internet usage, as well as to provide,
at the very least, the resources necessary for clients to prevent the
dissemination of their information into the digital universe for
collection, to the extent possible.
VI. PROTECTING ONE’S DIGITAL FOOTPRINT—THE BASICS OF
AVOIDING ONLINE TRACKING
No single article can serve to provide an all-encompassing
strategy capable of evading tracking of all activities across all
servers, platforms, and technologies. Technology today simply
317

See Bob Sullivan, Database Giant Gives Access to Fake Firms, NBC
NEWS (Feb. 14, 2005), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/6969799/ns/technology_
and_science-security/t/database-giant-gives-access-fake-firms/#.U-DDyVPLc6A.
318
See FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at 22 (stating that some of the largest data
brokers in the United States “store all data indefinitely”).
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develops and comes to market too quickly. However, if nothing
else, this Article is meant to serve predominantly as a wake-up call
to attorneys that their ethical obligations demand that they stay
abreast of current technological trends in the area of private digital
surveillance as well as changes in the law to that effect in order to
properly advise clients. This will require a concerted effort on the
part of bar associations across the country to provide relevant
CLEs that address these issues, as well as an individual effort on
the part of attorneys to remain up-to-date on technological trends
and developments to avoid their clients being blindsided in
litigation. With that caveat, however, there are several technologies
and practices whose use has been shown to dilute, diminish, or
disrupt the creation of a person’s digital footprint. Several of these
are discussed below.
A. Tor
Initially developed by the United States Navy’s Naval
Research Laboratory, first and foremost as a means of protecting
government communications, Tor (shorthand for “the onion router”)
is a freely available software and open network that is used
primarily as a means to mask an Internet user’s identity.319 At the
time of The Tor Project’s launching in 2002, the focus had shifted
somewhat from using Tor solely to protect government
communications to protecting individual users’ web activity from
the prying eyes of private corporations.320 Today, the Tor Project is
a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization, based in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, which receives funding from a variety of sources,
including Google, Human Rights Watch, the Department of
Defense, and the National Science Foundation.321
319

Tor: Overview, THE TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html
(last visited June 24, 2014); see also Stuart Dredge, What is Tor? A Beginner’s
Guide to the Privacy Tool, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2013, 7:47 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/05/tor-beginners-guide-nsabrowser.
320
Dredge, supra note 319.
321
Tor People, THE TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/about/corepeople.html
(last visited June 24, 2014); Brian Fung, The Feds Pay for 60 Percent of Tor’s
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Essentially, the Tor software masks a user’s location—and,
consequently, that user’s identity—by distributing a user’s web
traffic over several locations across the Internet, funneling one’s
web activity through multiple relays, thus inhibiting tracking.322
“Instead of taking a direct route from source to destination, data
packets on the Tor network take a random pathway through several
relays that cover your tracks so no observer at any single point can
tell where the data came from or where it’s going.”323 These relays
are maintained by series of computers on the Tor network that are
selected from Tor’s own volunteer-operated network in order to
disguise the origin and location of information as it is routed
through the Internet.324 Since Tor disguises a user’s IP address,
making one’s online activity appear to have originated from the
Tor network itself, a Tor user is, subject to some exceptions,325 able
to operate on the Internet without being tracked.326 This freedom
Development. Can Users Trust It?, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/06/the-feds-pays-for-60-percentof-tors-development-can-users-trust-it/; see also Keith D. Watson, Note: The
Tor Network: A Global Inquiry Into the Legal Status of Anonymity Networks, 11
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 715, 718 (2012); see also THE TOR PROJECT,
INC. AND AFFILIATE CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND REPORTS
REQUIRED FOR AUDITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH GOVERNMENT AUDITING
STANDARDS AND OMB CIRCULAR A-133 (Dec. 31, 2013), available at https://
www.torproject.org/about/findoc/2013-TorProject-FinancialStatements.pdf.
322
Tor: Overview, supra note 319.
323
Id.
324
Warwick Ashford, Growing Call for Anonymity Online, Says Cambridge
Researcher, COMPUTER WEEKLY (June 20, 2014, 3:04 PM), http://www.
computerweekly.com/news/2240223087/Growing-call-for-anonymity-online-saysCambridge-researcher.
325
See, e.g., SSD Project EFF: “Surveillance ‘Self-Defence Guide’ to ‘Survive
and Defend’ Your Civil Liberties’ Online,” ACE NEWS GROUP (Jan. 23, 2014),
http://acenewsservices.com/2014/01/23/ssd-project-eff-surveillance-self-defenceguide-to-survive-and-defend-your-civil-liberties-on-line/ (noting that Tor alone
will not defend against malware, and may not be completely successful against
extremely “resourceful and determined opponents” who have the means and the
wherewithal to monitor one’s activities at multiple places simultaneously).
326
See Stephanie K. Pell, Jonesing for a Privacy Mandate, Getting a Technology
Fix—Doctrine to Follow, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 489, 525–26 (2013) (“Tor is an
‘onion routing’ technology which hides a user’s IP address, making it appear to
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applies to both the contents of a message itself as well as a user’s
metadata. 327 There are a select few ways for law enforcement
agencies and other dedicated and sophisticated digital trackers to
unmask a user’s identity, particularly if that user is less than
scrupulous in terms of maintaining a certain degree of what might
be termed “anonymity discipline” with regard to the use of certain
unmasking programs and applications such as Flash player.328 Even
so, the consensus at present seems to be that, even in the face of
governmental surveillance, let alone private sector tracking, Tor
successfully protects anonymity for most people most of the
time.329

originate from a Tor server rather than the actual address from which the user is
connecting to the Internet”). As with all technologies, however, the efficacy of
the security and anonymity offered by Tor must be regularly monitored, as both
governments at home and abroad, as well as researchers and scholars, are
constantly attempting to penetrate the anonymity network. See James Ball, et al.,
NSA and GCHQ Target Tor Network That Protects Anonymity of Web Users, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2013, 10:50 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/
04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption. See also Ilya Khrennikov, Putin Sets
$110,000 Bounty for Cracking Tor as Anonymous Internet Usage in Russia Surges,
BLOOMBERG (July 29, 2014, 11:37 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201407-29/putin-sets-110-000-bounty-for-cracking-tor-as-anonymous-internet-usagein-russia-surges.html. Furthermore, two researchers at Carnegie Mellon University
Software Engineering Institute—funded primarily by the U.S. Department of
Defense—recently backed out of a talk they were set to give at the Black Hat
security conference. The researchers had claimed that they had figured out how
to hack Tor to ascertain users’ identities. It remains an open question whether
the security holes have since been patched. See Joseph Menn & Jim Finkle,
Internet Privacy Service Tor Warns Users It was Attacked, REUTERS (July 30,
2014, 6:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/30/us-privacy-softwareattack-idUSKBN0FZ1RZ20140730; see also Tor Security Advisory: “Relay Early”
Traffic Confirmation Attack, THE TOR PROJECT (July 30, 2014), https://blog.
torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-confirmation-attack.
327
Pell, supra note 326, at 526–27.
328
See, e.g., Kevin Poulsen, The FBI Used the Web’s Favorite Hacking Tool
to Unmask Tor Users, WIRED (Dec. 16, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/
2014/12/fbi-metasploit-tor/.
329
See, e.g., Allistair Charlton, Snowden Files Reveal NSA Had “Major Problems”
Tracking Tor Dark Web Users and Cracking Encryption, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec.
29, 2014, 2:38 PM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/snowden-files-reveal-nsa-had-major-
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Anonymous browsing has myriad applications. The Tor
website, for instance, divides its user base into “family and
friends,” “businesses,” “activists,” “media,” and “military and law
enforcement.”330 Although anonymous browsing obviously draws a
criminal element seeking to mask online illegal activities, Tor has
also found multitudes of users across the globe in countries like
Turkey, Egypt, Russia, and China due to increased censorship and
surveillance.331 Similarly, Tor recently rose in use among Iraqis in
the wake of the Nouri al-Maliki administration’s order to ISPs to
block social media and news website access within the country.332
Domestically, in addition to being employed as a tool to prevent
either private or public sector tracking, it has also been used by
victims of cyberstalking as a means to evade being tracked.333
As a practical matter, technical wizardry is not required to
achieve anonymous browsing. While a user may not be
invulnerable to certain sophisticated attacks if the full might of a
governmental agency has been devoted to tracking an individual,
anonymous browsing software should nevertheless be sufficient to
prevent the perpetual accumulation of personal data described
herein in most instances. Access to the Tor network, for instance,
is most easily achieved through the downloading and use of the
Tor Browser Bundle, available at the Tor Project’s website.334 The
problems-tracking-tor-dark-web-users-cracking-encryption-1481225; see also supra
note 326 and accompanying text.
330
Tor, THE TOR PROJECT, http://www.torproject.com (last visited July 16, 2014).
331
See, e.g., Jeff Stone, Iraqis Download Tor Anonymity Software to Subvert
Failed Internet Blockade, Browse Social Media, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 16,
2014, 4:35 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/iraqis-download-tor-anonymity-softwaresubvert-failed-internet-blockade-browse-social-1613076.
332
Id.
333
Meghan Neal, Tor Is Being Used as a Safe Haven for Victims of Cyberstalking,
MOTHERBOARD (May 9, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.motherboard.vice.com/
read/tor-is-being-used-as-a-safe-haven-for-victims-of-cyberstalking.
334
See Timothy B. Lee, Five Ways to Stop the NSA From Spying on You,
WASH. POST (June 10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
wp/2013/06/10/five-ways-to-stop-the-nsa-from-spying-on-you/ (describing Tor
as an essential component of any anti-tracking strategy, as well as describing the
ease of installing and using the Tor Browser Bundle); What is the Tor Browser?,

MAR. 2015]

Big Data & the Duty of Competence

613

browser itself, a modified version of the Firefox browser, is no
more difficult to use than other browsers, such as Chrome,
Explorer, or Safari, to which most Internet users have become
accustomed.335
Another method, recently developed by a company called
Pogoplug, involves the use of a product called Safeplug, which
allows users to directly access the benefits of Tor by plugging the
Safeplug into their home router.336 Safeplug acts as a proxy server,
and allows users to use their preferred browsers and still take
advantage of the anonymity benefits of the Tor network.337 There is
also an application available for mobile phone browsing for
Android operating systems called Orbot that permits users to
browse anonymously from their mobile phones.338
The downside, however, is that currently the Tor network is
likely slower than the browsing speed to which most American
consumers have become accustomed. 339 This is a result of the
repeated relaying of information through multiple points around
the Internet before arriving at its destination.340 The upside is that
the more users that get on the Tor network and volunteer to relay
THE TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html (last visited
Jun. 25, 2014).
335
What is the Tor Browser?, supra note 334; see also Jason Kennedy, How
to Use Tor, and Is It Actually Safe and Anonymous, EXTREME TECH (Oct. 26,
2011, 11:29 AM), http://www.extremetech.com/computing/101633-how-to-usetor-and-is-it-actually-safe-and-anonymous (describing the ease of using Tor).
336
Olivia Solon, Safeplug Makes It Super-Easy to Harness Tor’s Anonymity
at Home, WIRED (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/201311/22/safeplug-tor.
337
Id.; see also Lucas Mearian, Tiny Anonabox to Offer Online Anonymity
Through Tor, COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.computerworld.
com/article/2825065/tiny-anonabox-to-offer-online-anonymity-through-tor.html
(describing Anonabox, a similar device that further encrypts a user’s Internet
traffic).
338
See Tor on Android, THE TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/docs/
android.html.en (last visited Jun. 25, 2014) (describing Orbot); see also
DRAWBRIDGE supra note 56 and accompanying text.
339
See Tor FAQ: Why Is Tor So Slow?, THE TOR PROJECT, https://www.
torproject.org/docs/faq (last visited Jun. 25, 2014).
340
Id.
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traffic for others, the faster the network becomes.341 Perhaps not
surprisingly, in the year following Edward Snowden’s leaks
regarding the National Security Agency’s online spying programs,
reports have indicated that the Tor software has been downloaded
approximately 120 million times, and this increase in users could
help limit the speed issues currently facing the Tor network.342
B. Non-Tracking Search Engines
In a largely unregulated industry in which personal data
collection, sale, and analysis are profitable, the best protection is to
prevent information—any information—about one’s self from
being collected in the first place. Regular Tor usage is a big step in
that direction. Another such step is use of a search engine whose
own policies do not permit the logging and recording of search
queries and user information.
Most major search engines constantly collect and store user
information, including search queries, IP addresses, device information,
and the like during usage. 343 However, in recent years privacy
advocates have suggested the usage of so-called “non-tracking”
search engines as part of an overall privacy strategy.344 For instance,
341

Id.
Patrick Howell O’Neill, Tor Internet Privacy Tool Sees Downloads Jump
to 120 Million, DAILY DOT (June 2, 2014), http://www.dailydot.com/technology/
tor-downloads-120-million-snowden-nsa/; see also What Is Tor?, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/torchallenge/what-is-tor.html (last visited
Aug. 19, 2014) (stating that “[t]he more Tor relays we have running, the faster,
more robust, and more secure the Tor network will be”).
343
See, e.g., Privacy & Terms: Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/
intl/en/policies/privacy/?fg=1 (last modified Dec. 19, 2014) (“When you use our
services or view content provided by Google, we may automatically collect and
store certain information in server logs. This includes” search queries, telephone
log information, IP address, device information, and “cookies that may uniquely
identify your browser or your Google Account.”); see also Yahoo! Privacy
Center, YAHOO, https://info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/ (last updated Sept. 25,
2014) (stating that “Yahoo automatically receives and records information from
your computer and browser, including your IP address Yahoo cookie
information, software and hardware attributes, and the page you request”).
344
See, e.g., Kate Murphy, How to Muddy Your Tracks on the Internet, N.Y.
TIMES (May 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/03/technology/personaltech/
342
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non-tracking search engine DuckDuckGo.com explicitly states that it
“does not collect or share personal information. That is our privacy
policy in a nutshell.”345 By conducting all searches using a nontracking search engine, users can greatly reduce the amount of
information available for collection, aggregation, sale to data
brokers or other third parties, subpoena, or potential loss due to
hacking attacks, security holes or technical incompetence. In the
wake of increased public awareness of both corporate and
governmental tracking of online activities, DuckDuckGo has
experienced continuous and steady growth since its inception, and
as of January 2014 was averaging upwards of four million queries
per day.346
C. Do Not Track & Private Browser Settings
The DNT concept began gaining traction in late 2010 when the
FTC issued recommendations for the creation and implementation
of a mechanism somewhat akin to a “do not call” list for the
Internet.347 Initially, DNT was conceived as a means to empower
users to control the degree to which first- and third-party websites
may monitor their online activity through the use of easy-to-use
browser settings that, when enabled, were capable of either
blocking third-party cookies by default or sending a signal to
websites that the user prefers not to be tracked.348 For instance,
when a user activates the DNT feature in Firefox, Firefox then

how-to-muddy-your-tracks-on-the-internet.html?_r=0; see also 5 Alternative Search
Engines that Respect Your Privacy, HOW TO GEEK, http://www.howtogeek.com/
113513/5-alternative-search-engines-that-respect-your-privacy/ (last visited Aug.
19, 2014).
345
Privacy Policy, DUCKDUCKGO.COM, https://duckduckgo.com/privacy#2s
(last visited July 16, 2014); see also ixquick.com Privacy Policy, IXQUICK,
https://www.ixquick.com/eng/privacy-policy.html? (last visited Jan. 10, 2015).
346
James Vincent, DuckDuckGo Hits 1bn Annual Searches: Non-Tracking
Search Engine Boosted by Privacy Fears, THE INDEPENDENT (Jan. 10, 2014),
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/duckduckgo-hits-1bnannual-searches-nontracking-search-engine-boosted-by-privacy-fears-9051081.html.
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See 2010 FTC REPORT, supra note 39, at 10–11.
348
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conveys this message to every website visited, including
advertisers.349
As previously touched upon above, however, this initiative has
met with limited success primarily due to an unwillingness by
many to abide by users’ Do Not Track requests or companies’
inclusions of provisions within their privacy policies that still
permit partial tracking in spite of such requests.350 Mozilla, for
example, candidly notes that whether websites honor these
requests or not is voluntary.351 Moreover, the Digital Advertising
Alliance (“DAA”), a “self-regulatory body that develops industry
best practices and effective solutions for consumer choice in online
behavioral advertising,” 352 recently withdrew its support of the
DNT initiative, leaving this practice’s continued utility further in
question.353
While there has been some legislative push to make respecting
a consumer’s DNT request a mandatory requirement, this effort
has received little traction in Congress. 354 Absent widespread
respect for consumers’ DNT requests, consumers may choose to
utilize any one of several widely available extensions such as
Ghostery, AdBlock, and Disconnect, which permit users to
exercise some degree of control over which particular entity is
tracking them on a given website.355 Although certainly not as
349

Mozilla Support—How Do I Turn on the Do Not Track Feature?, MOZILLA,
https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/how-do-i-turn-do-not-track-feature
(last
visited Aug. 25, 2014).
350
WHITE HOUSE BIG DATA REPORT, supra note 4, at 43.
351
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352
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2011), http://www.aaaa.org/news/press/Pages/060711_alliance_first100.aspx.
353
See Katy Bachman, Digital Advertising Alliance Exits Do Not Track
Group, Development Could Renew Calls for Privacy Laws, AD WEEK (Sept. 17,
2013), http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/digital-advertising-alliance-existsdo-not-track-group-152475.
354
See, e.g., Do-Not-Track Online Act of 2011, S. 913, 112th Cong. (2011).
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See generally Rick Broida, Six Browser Plug-Ins that Protect Your Privacy,
COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 17, 2014, 3:30 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/
article/2692560/six-browser-plug-ins-that-protect-your-privacy.html.
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comprehensive a solution as, for instance, regular Tor usage, these
add-ons can be added to a user’s web browser to limit ad tracking
and block online ads. Ghostery, for instance, states that it is
functionally “different than opting-out or blocking cookies because
those strategies still allow the browser to communicate with the
web service . . . . When blocking is enabled, Ghostery never allows
the communication in the first place.”356
D. Non-Scanning Email Services
As some are now aware, it is not uncommon for some of the
largest email providers to process the contents of email
communications in order to more effectively tailor advertisements
directed at specific users.357 For instance, Google’s terms of service
states, “Our automated systems analyze your content (including
emails) to provide you personally relevant product features, such
as customized search results, tailored advertising, and spam and
malware detection. This analysis occurs as the content is sent,
received, and when it is stored.”358 This practice has already been
the subject of ongoing litigation, as well as no small amount of
ethical head-scratching by attorneys, although the general
consensus now seems to be that these services are acceptable, at
least from a confidentiality standpoint, provided that no human
beings are actually reviewing emails.359 However, now that Google
has recently opened the door to scanning users’ email accounts for
evidence of criminal activity and turning these findings over to law
enforcement, an additional, more direct incentive exists to close

356
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(last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
357
See, e.g., In re Google, Inc., Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-2430-LHK, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36957 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014) (quoting Google privacy
policy and discussing email scanning).
358
Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/
terms/ (last modified Apr. 14, 2014).
359
See supra note 290 and accompanying text; see generally Kevin Raudebaugh,
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Use Gmail, 6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 83 (2010).
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down any email accounts with companies whose privacy policies
permit the regular scanning of emails.360
Erring on the side of caution, presuming both that it cannot be
said with any certainty to what uses one’s stored data will be put in
the future, and that, as a result, the ultimate goal is to limit the total
amount of one’s personal data being collected and stored by the
data collection industry, it is advisable to forgo using email
services which employ scanning protocols as a matter of course. In
place of such services, lesser-known free services such as
HushMail,361 RiseUp,362 and Zoho363 have been promoted by some
privacy advocates.364 RiseUp’s privacy policy, for instance, states,
“Our commitment is to keep as little data on you as we can. Unlike
corporate providers, we do not log internet addresses of anyone
using riseup.net services, including email.”365 Another option is the
registration of a unique domain with an associated email address
through services such as Hover or BlueHost. 366 A soon to be
available addition to the growing list of privacy oriented email
providers is Dark Mail, offered by the Dark Mail Technical
Alliance. 367 Although billed primarily as a means to evade
government snooping in light of recent disclosures regarding
360
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361
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363
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364
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365
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ongoing domestic NSA surveillance, Dark Mail offers standard
encryption to email content, while also taking the unusual step of
encrypting an email’s metadata.368
E. Smartphones
Approximately ninety percent of American adults own a
cellular phone as of January 2014.369 Of those, two-thirds use their
phones to access the Internet, and the total number has doubled
since 2009.370 January 2014 also marked the first time that mobile
devices have accounted for a majority of the total Internet usage in
the United States.371 Given this consumer climate, it should not be
surprising that companies have formed alliances that are dedicated
to aiding private sector entities in the linking of consumers’
computers to their mobile devices to better facilitate data collection
and targeted advertising. 372 This phenomenon, combined with
recent increases in some consumers’ privacy sensitivity due to
revelations regarding both government domestic spying programs
and private sector data collection have given rise to new,
market-driven technological innovations in cellular technology.
For example, in 2014, Apple and Google developed iOS and
Android operating system versions, respectively, with encryption
that does not permit the companies to unlock the smartphones at
the behest of law enforcement, even upon the receipt of a court

368
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order to do so. 373 However, in the realm of cellular privacy,
Blackphone reigns supreme, at least for the time being.
Self-described as “the product of the best privacy minds in the
industry,” the Blackphone utilizes PrivatOS, an Android based
operating system combined with a number of unique security
measures designed to prevent data collection and government
snooping.374 Because the device employs no Google services due to
Google’s failure to endorse PrivatOS, Blackphone will certainly
feel somewhat foreign initially. However, early reviews have been
generally positive due to unique privacy features, which, for
instance, permit users to select specific permissions for
downloaded apps and keep such permissions turned off by
default.375 The phone also has remote wiping functions and secure
search, browsing, voice, video, and text functions.376 Although it
currently comes with a hefty price tag north of six hundred dollars,
and thus may only be attractive in the immediate future to those in
sensitive corporate or government positions or those who are
uniquely privacy-oriented, the general consensus thus far seems to
be that Blackphone lives up to the hype. As one tech writer
recently put it, “If data has value, so, apparently, does protecting
it.”377
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VII. CONCLUSION
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, prior to Facebook’s meteoric
rise and ensuing cultural ubiquity, had the legal profession been
able to foresee that every tagged drunken spring break photo,
2:00 AM status update, and furious wall post would one day be
vulnerable to potential exposure in the cold, unforgiving light of
civil and criminal litigation, attorneys would have been
well-advised to discuss the ramifications of such actions,
statements, and disclosures with their clients. This Article posits
that another similar phenomenon is looming in the form of data
collection, aggregation, analysis, and sale,378 and that it will be the
prudent attorney who competently advises his clients to stay ahead
of the curve.
This Article is meant to take no position on the obvious Fourth
Amendment implications of felon-identifying programs,379 nor is it
meant to be a thorough analytical critique of the shortcomings of
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, or the notice and
consent model. Nor is it meant to be an indictment of the data
broker industry generally. No one should be surprised when an
industry engages in practices that are profitable, innovative, and
legal. This Article does, however, suggest that, given the
foregoing, the most prudent course of action is one that is
farsighted and includes the development of comprehensive
strategies designed to maximize privacy and limit the amount of
clients’ personal data that flows out into the world. This is due to
two simple realities: (1) the more one person knows about another,
the easier it is for the information holder to manipulate that person
and demand their obedience, and (2) everyone’s information is for
sale.
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